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The population of Lithuania has been declining for the last 25 years. This has mainly 
been caused by high emigration out of the country. In particular, of young adults 
seeking job opportunities abroad. This has made the demographic composition of the 
country unfavourable for sustaining a strong social system due to the increased ratio of 
pensioners. The goal of this thesis was to analyse the migration trend of labour 
emigration in the context of the theoretical literature and try to replicate it using a 
system dynamics model based on the migration theories of neo-classical economics and 
network theory. The model managed to replicate the population development in 
Lithuania but failed to fully explain the peaks and valleys in the emigration flow, 
indicating that the model could benefit from drawing from additional migration theory 
literature. Moreover, since there is no unified statistical method for documentation of 
migration, data challenges cause an additional level of uncertainty in the reference data. 
The government of Lithuania has been aware of the emigration issue and approved 
policy guidelines in order to alleviate the problem. The policies have however been no 
more than wishful thinking, rather than actual actions, since funding has not been 
allocated accordingly. Policy measures that could be taken in order to relieve the 
problem are discussed in this thesis as well as implementation challenges that could act 
as a barrier for the process. One thing is for sure, if the trend continues, it will have a 
negative effect on the social system as well as the economy. 
 
Keywords: System dynamics, neo-classical economics theory, network theory, labour 
emigration, public policy.  
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Population in Lithuania has been declining since the early 1990s. Negative natural 
change is a big part of that development caused by low fertility and relatively high 
mortality compared to other EU countries. However, the biggest contributor to the 
development is the negative net migration rate. Emigration out of Lithuania has far 
exceeded the immigration into the country for the last 25 years. Lithuania will be one of 
the countries experiencing the highest rate of population decrease by 2050 according to 
United Nations projection if the trend continues (Stankūnienė, Jasilionis, & 
Hendrixson, 2009). In 1990 the population of Lithuania was just below 4 million and 
today the population has dropped below 3 million, as can be seen in the graph in   
Figure 1. Eurostat expects the population to fall below 2 million by 2040 (European 
Commission, 2015a). The government of Lithuania has therefore significant interest in 
finding a solution to the problem of declining population as it will have enormous 
consequences for the country’s economy and public welfare if the projections become 
reality.  
 
Figure 1 - Total annual average population in Lithuania over time. Data from the Demographic Yearbook 2013 
published by Statistics Lithuania. 
The historical aspect of the migration process in Lithuania has to be seen in the context 
of world history as it is a state that was formerly a part of the Soviet Union. The 
development of migration in the country in the last 25 years is relatively similar to the 
development in other former Soviet countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  




After the fall of the Berlin wall, which led to the breakup of USSR, there were multiple 
factors that contributed to emigration from Central Europe. After 1991, new migration 
patterns emerged where there was constant negative net migration and increase in 
labour emigration. Even though formerly exiled Lithuanians have been returning to the 
country since it restored its independence in 1990, the net migration flow has still been 
negative (Brake, 2007). Some of the emigration can be explained by ethnic minorities 
that were placed in Lithuania as a part of forced labour relocation coming from 
Moscow. People from other parts of the Soviet Union, especially Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, were placed in Lithuania to increase the industrial workforce, tie the country 
closer to the union and deter any revolution. In 1989 approximately 10% of the 
Lithuanian population was foreign born and after the breakup of USSR many of those 
foreign born nationals decided to move back to their origin country. The outflow of this 
group of people peaked in 1993 and 1994. After the fall of communism, it was widely 
expected that there would be mass migration from the east to the west. Even though 
migration from the east to the west was significant, the forecasts were wrong in the 
sense that even though emigration turned out to be massive, most of it was actually 
within the central and eastern European region itself (Massey & Taylor, 2004). 
It has been hypothesized that the mass emigration could be a result of a backlog 
of people that desired to move away from the countries but were unable to due to the 
restriction of population movement out of the Soviet Union. The push factors in post-
Soviet Central Europe seem to have had a major effect on the emigration from the 
region, high unemployment being one of them. Under the rule of communism, all 
people were ensured jobs even though there was no real need for as many workers as 
were employed in certain areas of industries, resulting in over-employment. In addition 
to that, the level of technological advancement was low so sectors such as agriculture 
and heavy industry required more workers than was normal in the western part of 
Europe. When the former Soviet countries transitioned from communism into a market 
economy, these sectors were restructured resulting in high unemployment. At the same 
time, there was a demand for low-skilled workers in construction and agriculture in the 
western part of Europe that encouraged many to migrate to the west. After transitioning 
to a market economy the post-Soviet countries normally experienced low wages relative 
to the west, high unemployment and relative poverty, while the west offered better job 
opportunities with higher earnings (Kupiszewski, 2013). The high unemployment rate 




coupled with little social protection made some groups more vulnerable than others, 
which then became more likely to emigrate to the west. The groups consist mainly of 
the young, the unskilled and those who recently finished education. 
Lithuania became a part of the European Union in 2004 which meant that it 
became easier for people to migrate since accession to the union meant free movement 
of people. The number of Lithuanians working or studying abroad increased further 
after the EU accession. There are indications that the reasons behind emigration are 
mainly economical (Brake, 2007). In 2002, Lithuania was for example above the EU 
average when it came to unemployment while the country was below EU average in 
GDP per capita (The World Bank, 2014).  
Since this thesis is focusing on migration issues in Lithuania, it is necessary to 
look at the historical emigration flow. Figure 2 shows the estimated emigration by 
Statistics Lithuania (lt. Lietuvos Statistikos Departmentas).  
 
Figure 2 – The estimated emigration flow out of Lithuania from 1990-2013 by Statistics Lithuania. 
The first wave of emigration in Lithuania took place in the beginning of the 1990s and 
it was mainly for ethnic reasons. The second and third wave of migration can be linked 
to Lithuania’s accession to the EU in 2004 and the global economic crisis in 2008. The 
model will be focusing on labour migration and social networking, so ethnic migration 
will be treated as an exogenous factor in the model. The time horizon that is chosen  for 
this work is therefore between 2001 and 2013.  
 The reason why the labour migration flow is much lower in the 1990s than it is in 
the 2000s, could be due to the fact that even though it had been financially beneficial to 
emigrate, it came with great psychological costs. Potential destination countries were 
also not really open to legal migration of Lithuanians before 2004, and even then not all 
EU countries opened up their borders for migrants from Lithuania until recently. Since 
labour migration was mainly illegal all processes such as finding a job, seeking housing 




and possibly also working conditions could have taken a greater toll on the migrants. 
The level of technology we enjoy today was also less advanced in the 1990s. Computers 
were not necessarily a household item at that time and technology that makes 
communication between people, such as Skype and mobile phones, were less developed 
or did not yet exist. Therefore one might conclude that access to communication 
methods to stay in contact with family and friends back home has also had its effect on 
the psychological cost of emigrating. That coupled with the fact that destination 
countries were not open to Lithuanians could explain why labour emigration out of 
Lithuania was not greater than what we can observe on the graph in the 1990s. 
 If the emigration trend continues it will result in major problems for the 
government of Lithuania, as mostly people at a working age are emigrating, leaving the 
elderly behind. Coupled with low fertility, the sustainability of the demographic 
composition of the country could be compromised. The problem raises issues of many 
aspects, one being national security. If the trend continues on the similar path as it is 
now, the old age dependency ratio in the country could rise to an unsustainable level for 
the social welfare system. Declining labour force in the country due to emigration of 
people at a working age can also jeopardize economic growth, especially if extensive 
brain drain of highly skilled workforce takes place. It is important for the government to 
recognize and understand the dynamics behind the trend and include ways to alleviate 
the problem in their policy making. Sociologist Vladas Gaidys says in an interview with 
Vox Europ that if there will be nothing done to tackle the reasons behind emigration, it 
will only continue to grow. He concludes that "the good life does not come easily in 
Lithuania" (Bolzané, 2012). 
1.2 Research objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to and extend the research literature on migration 
and hopefully guide readers through the underlying structures of the system in which 
the problem originated. It is challenging to find a successful solution to any problem 
unless policy makers have a deep and clear understanding of the dynamics behind it. 
That applies not only to problems in the private sector, but also, and no less importantly 
to the public sector. As we all know, the public sector is full of complex issues that 




decision makers attempt to solve. They design policies in order to diminish the effect of 
public problems to the lives of the people that live within the country. In this case we 
are dealing with emigration issues in Lithuania and problems that follow which have 
major consequences within the society. Decision makers, in this case politicians and 
policy advisors, need to understand both the behaviour of the system as well as its 
underlying structure. Only then is it possible to gain insights into the problem at hand 
and find realistic solutions to it.  





In order to achieve the research objectives relevant literature is presented to give 
insights into the context in which the problem takes place. The system dynamics 
approach will be used to build a computer model of the system in order to understand 
the reasons for the trend in the data. The model’s behaviour will be analyzed in order to 
gain insights into the major feedback loops that will prove to have the biggest effect. 
After analyzing the model there will be discussions on possible policies that could 
contribute to solving the problem of declining population. They will include discussions 
on feasibility, implementation challenges, costs and benefits of those policies as well as 
the political environment that the solution has to be implemented in. Recommendations 
for further research in this area will also be suggested.  
2.1 The system dynamics approach 
Using the system dynamics method when analyzing an issue we start by defining the 
problem and discuss why it is important, who is affected and why we need to alleviate 
it. Then we develop a hypothesis for what is going on and build a computer simulation 
model that represents the hypothesis. After that we analyze the model by looking at the 
behaviour that it is producing and the structure of the system that lies behind it. The last 
two steps involve testing policy options for alleviating the problem and discussing 
possible implementation challenges that the suggested policy might face.  
 The computer model is built around the idea of a stock and flow system. Its 
purpose is to keep track of accumulations in the system where the stocks are influenced 
by the flows.  
 
Figure 3 – A stock and flow diagram of migration 
The flows are either in- or outflows from the stock and in the case of migration, as we 
see in Figure 3, immigration is the inflow and emigration is the outflow. If the outflow 




is bigger than the inflow, the population stock depletes and that is the situation in 
Lithuania. 
 
Figure 4 – A stock and flow diagram showing population development 
A population stock is also affected by the inflow of births and the outflow of deaths as 
can be seen in Figure 4. The outflow of deaths is dependent on the average lifetime of 
the population and the inflow of births if dependent on the fractional birth rate. If the 
death rate is larger than the birth rate it is called natural decrease of a population. 
 
Figure 5 – A causal loop diagram of how births, deaths and population size influence each other. Source: Sterman, 
2000. 
A causal loop diagram (CLD) gives insights into the feedback of the system. A variable 
never stands alone and is always influenced by something else in the system. For 
example, the left loop in Figure 5 shows the relationship between birth rate and 
population. When birth rate increases, so does the population. When the population 
grows, the birth rate goes up. There are plus signs assigned to the arrows in the loop and 
therefore we say that the feedback in this case is a reinforcing one. On the right side of 
Figure 5, we have the loop representing the relationship between death rate and 
population. When we have an increase in the population, the death rate increases as 




well. The higher death rate we have, the less people. Since we have an arrow here 
showing a negative relationship in the loop, we identify it as a balancing loop. If the 
loop holds an odd number of negative relationships, it is considered a balancing loop. 
(Sterman, 2004).  
2.2 Limitations / Boundaries 
As with every problem that is analyzed using any modelling method, there will always 
be ways to improve upon since it is far from perfect. Complex processes linked with 
socio-economic issues such as migration will never be captured fully by computer 
models. A model is not able to capture every individual decision making process. There 
is always a need for assumptions and generalizations. The system dynamics method 
enables one to look at issues from another perspective and has been proven to be a 
valuable tool in analyzing problems and adding to their understanding. The model in 
this case and the analysis of the issue will only be within the boundaries of Lithuania. 
Economic situations in destination countries will be exogenous and a number of 
feedback loops will be left out of the model in order to simplify it. 
 One of the biggest challenges in this thesis is the fact that data on emigration in 
Lithuania is far from perfect. In fact, due to high numbers of undeclared emigration, 
Statistics Lithuania has had to rely on estimations. 
 
Figure 6 - The discrepancy between declared migration and estimated emigration by the 2011 Housing census. 
Data from Statistics Lithuania and the Lithuanian housing census 2011 
The discrepancy between estimations of total emigration out of Lithuania and declared 
emigration can be seen in Figure 6. The reason that the columns match perfectly with 
each other from 2010 is because Statistics Lithuania assumes that after that time, all 
emigration is declared. Changes were made to the law on health insurance in Lithuania 




in 2010, obliging all registered permanent residents of Lithuania to pay health insurance 
contributions. After 2010 emigrants are therefore considered to have an incentive to 
declare their departure to avoid unnecessary payments, making the statistics on 
emigration more reliable (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2014). The 
discrepancy between various columns in Figure 6 emphasizes the shortcomings of the 
data prior to 2010. Declared emigration appears to be far from the real emigration rate 
out of the country. It is highly plausible that the declared emigration in 2010 and 2011 
is over-exaggerated since people who had previously emigrated without declaring it 
now had the incentive to return and declare that they had moved.  
 A large portion of emigration is undeclared, which means that the official data 
provided by Statistics Lithuania does not represent reality even though it provides a 
clear indication of the general trend. For example, the age structure of emigrants is 
somewhat unknown, as well as marital status and gender (Stankuniene and Jasilionis 
2009). Therefore, it is a challenge to come up with a reference mode for the total 
emigration flow out of Lithuania that best represents detailed reality. However, we can 
make the assumption from available official statistical data that the largest group 
leaving the country is young people, mainly in the age group 15 to 29 years old 
(Ranceva & Rakauskienė, 2012).  
Lithuania defines an emigrant as someone leaving Lithuania who has the 
intention to take up a permanent residence in another country for more than six months 
(Statistics Lithuania, 2006). At one time, Statistics Lithuania used data from the 
Population Register to create data on migration, but that did not reflect the real 
situation. As a result it was decided that other measures were needed to complement the 
statistics on declared migration. The 2001 Housing and Population Census was the first 
attempt to enumerate all permanent residents in Lithuania and the census work was 
carried out in cooperation and with recommendations from institutions such as Eurostat 
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (hereafter UNECE). The 
census work was deemed successful as it fully complied with European standards and 
the results were comparable with those of other countries. The 2001 census created 
estimates for undeclared emigration from the year 1990 to 2000 based on the exhaustive 
demographical information that was gathered (Official Statistics Portal, 2001). 
Since the census is only conducted once every decade, Statistics Lithuania 
experimented with ways to enhance the quality of their population statistics. After 




comparing data from various administrative bodies within the government, it was 
deemed too inaccurate. Definitions that were used were not compatible and the level of 
uncertainty was too high. Following that process, Statistics Lithuania carried out an 
annual survey from 2006 to 2009 where undeclared emigration was assessed. The 
survey was based on the annual Labour force survey and it was designed to give 
information on undeclared emigration from 2001 to 2005 as well (Lapeniene, 2009). 
The results allowed for estimations on the main demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the emigrants and they indicated that only two thirds of residents of 
Lithuania declared their departure when emigrating out of the country (United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, 2014). The estimations were statistically satisfactory, but 
not without some uncertainty (Statistics Lithuania, 2010). The biggest challenge that 
Statistics Lithuania faced was to figure out the best possible way to integrate the 
estimates on undeclared migration from these surveys with the data on declared 
migration. The Population and Housing census was repeated in 2011 where the total 
population of Lithuania was enumerated again (Statistics Lithuania, 2013). The census 
is unique among surveys since it covers the entire population, and is therefore seen as 
one of the most reliable ways to measure migration stocks. The fact that the census is 
only carried out once every decade makes it harder to estimate annual migration flows. 
However, the data that was collected in the housing census survey was useful in further 
enhancing the estimations of undeclared emigration. The UNECE mentioned Lithuania 
in a practical guide for countries of Eastern Europe on statistics on international 
migration, where it was stated that the country had successfully been able to estimate 
undeclared migration using household surveys (Chudinovskikh, 2011). 
One of the ways to measure the validity of the estimated emigration out of 
Lithuania is using a method called “mirror statistics”, where data from the country of 
origin is compared to the data collected in the country of destination. Immigration flows 
are considered to be measured more accurately than emigration flows since data on 
foreigners is often more accurate and complete than data on nationals. That kind of a 
comparison might shed light on contradiction in the data and motivate discussions 
between the reporting countries regarding definitions and methodology 
(Chudinovskikh, 2011). 
 With Norway being one of the main destinations of emigrating Lithuanians in 
recent years it was interesting to compare the statistics of the emigration flow reported 




and estimated by the two countries. Statistics Norway (no. Statistisk Sentralbyrå, SSB) 
defines an immigrant as a person that is born abroad or in Norway, to two parents and 
four grandparents that all hold a foreign citizenship. Persons who come to Norway and 
stay for less than six months are not considered as immigrated, and people who leave 
Norway within six months are not considered as emigrated (Statistics Norway, 2015). 
The statistics are not able to capture the persons that stay in Norway under six months 
without working, those who cross the borders on a regular basis or those who reside in 
the country illegally. As stated by most recent statistics by Statistics Norway, 35.000 
Lithuanians are registered in Norway as long term migrants staying for more than 6 
months as well as 8.000 short term migrants. The boxed line on the graph in Figure 7 
represents the official number of Lithuanians that have been registered in Norway every 
year from 2002 to 2013.  
 
Figure 7 - Estimated emigration of Lithuanians to Norway over time compared to the total registered Lithuanian 
immigrants in Norway. Data from Statistics Norway and the Lithuanian housing census 2011. 
The number far exceeds the total estimated emigration from Lithuania to Norway by the 
2011 census showed on the same graph. The discrepancy in the data recorded by the 
two countries between 2006 and 2009 supports the belief that the emigration peak 
estimated by Statistics Lithuania in 2010 includes many previous emigrants and that 
using a reference mode that takes that into account can be justified. Both countries work 
from similar definitions of migrants with the same time frame of 6 months, so it would 
be interesting to find out where the difference in the numbers is coming from. One 
possible explanation is that the numbers given from Lithuania represent people moving 
to Norway, regardless of citizenship. The numbers from Norway are however 
immigrants that have Lithuanian citizenship, regardless of where they are coming from. 




There has been evidence of a growing trend in recent years that emigrants from 
Lithuania do not necessarily move back to their origin country if they choose to move 
away from their destination country. In fact, they could be tempted to move to the third 
country, which would explain some of the difference between the numbers.  
 
Figure 8 - Estimated emigration of Lithuanians to Germany over time compared to the total registered Lithuanian 
immigrants in Germany. Data from destatis.de and the Lithuanian housing census 2011. 
If we use the same method of mirror statistics and apply it to the major 
destination country of Germany we see a similar pattern. People that migrate to 
Germany with the intention to stay for more than two months are obligated to register 
into the country (Saxon State Chancellery, 2015). Since they use a different definition 
for a migrant than Lithuania, it could explain some of the discrepancy in the data in 
Figure 8. However, both data on Lithuanian immigrants in Norway and Germany are 
showing a similar trend. The emigration into these countries that is estimated by 
Statistics Lithuania corresponds quite well to the reported immigration of Lithuanians 
up until 2005. After that there is a clear discrepancy which reaches a peak at 2011. This 
supports the belief that the peak in the estimated emigration data from Statistics 
Lithuania in 2010 needs to be adjusted.      
The United Kingdom is the main destination for emigrating Lithuanians. In an 
article that was published in the Guardian in January 2013 it was mentioned that a 
recent population census in the United Kingdom had registered 100.000 Lithuanians in 
the country. Before the census came out, the Lithuanian embassy had told reporters that 
they believed that as many as 200.000 Lithuanians were living in the UK (Pidd, 2013). 
It would also be interesting to compare the estimated and reported flows of people 
between Lithuania and the UK to do a comparison since it has been the main country of 




destination since Lithuania joined the EU. However, the UK only has data accessible 
online that categorizes Lithuania in a group with other central European countries. 
Lithuania as well as other European countries could benefit greatly from making 
detailed data on migration flows reported in their countries available to each other in 
able to do a comparison and improve on and discuss methods (Lapeniene, 2009). 
 
Figure 9 – The reference mode of the model is the emigration flow out of Lithuania. The solid line is the estimation 
from Statistics Lithuania and the dashed line is a suggestion for a more likely scenario. 
The reference mode that has been chosen is the dashed line in Figure 9 as it is 
considered to be a scenario that resembles reality in a more convincing fashion. The 
peak in 2010 is treated as an accumulated number for undeclared emigration in the 
previous years. The emigration flow in 2010 is estimated to be only slightly higher than 
the one measured in 2011, and the discrepancy is divided by 4 and added on to the 
values for years 2006 to 2009. This way was chosen in order to be as little intrusive on 
the existing data, however it is possible that the curve should be higher before 2010 and 











3. MIGRATION THEORY 
There are many disciplines that study the phenomenon of migration. To this day, no 
discipline has been able to form a universal theory that manages to explain all aspects 
of migration. That is not to say that there is a shortage of theories on the subject. On the 
contrary, different disciplines such as economics, demography, political science, law, 
anthropology, history and other social sciences all strive to come up with a theory that is 
best suited for explaining migration. Each discipline explains migration from its own 
point of view which has led to a large diversity of migration theories. All the theories 
strive to answer the questions of who moves, when they move, why some people move 
while others choose to stay and why migration is sustained over time.  
Anthropology looks at migration and how it develops in small groups through 
social networks. Sociology looks at migration as a process with many different 
outcomes that depend on labour markets, social capital and institutional structures. 
Sociology also researches how people incorporate the experiences that they have as 
migrants (Brettell & Hollifield, 2013). History examines migration in small groups or 
even from the view of the individual and the discipline looks at experiences of those 
groups or individuals (Brettell & Hollifield, 2013).  Political science is more focused on 
the role of the state, national security, foreign policy, concepts like citizenship, how the 
government is involved in the migration process and why it has a difficulty controlling 
the situation (Brettell & Hollifield, 2013). The law discipline looks at legislation and 
how it discourages or enables migration as well as how the legal system copes with the 
process (Brettell & Hollifield, 2013). Economics explains migration by assuming that 
human beings are rational creatures that seek to maximize their utility. Also, the 
concept of human capital is crucial in economic theories of migration (Brettell & 
Hollifield, 2013). Economists highlight push and pull factors, propensity to migrate 
related to supply and demand as well as the effects that the phenomenon has on the 
economic side of the society, both in the sending and the receiving country. 
Demography deals with migration as well, as it is an important bi-flow of people and 
the discipline's main research focus is the population itself and how it develops (Brettell 
& Hollifield, 2013). When scanning through the many theories on migration and 
standpoints of these disciplines, one finds a valid point of view in each of them. They 




all contribute to explaining migration from their perspective even though none of them 
is able to fully explain every case of emerging or established migration patterns.  
Migration theories can also be divided into the categories of the micro, meso 
and macro approach in addition to dividing them by disciplines. The micro level looks 
at migration from the individual decision making process. It looks at the person’s 
values, desires and what they expect as an outcome. The individual is believed to 
migrate to improve or secure his survival, to enhance wealth or comfort, to maintain a 
status or receive stimulation. The resources that the individual is able to use in the 
migration process are his money, information and connections to others. The macro 
level looks at the migration process from a broader structural level where economics, 
politics, demography and culture are looked at in relation to each other and how they 
work together. Income and unemployment are important in the economical perspective 
and how the political environment is in regards to regulations and cooperation with 
other nation states influences those factors. The culture in a given country generates 
certain norms that are easier for certain groups to relate to which then effects migration 
patterns. Population growth, the level of technology and availability of land and natural 
resources also pay a role in creating a certain environment, either encouraging or 
discouraging migration. The macro level looks at the balance and the structure between 
the political, economic and cultural spheres and how the role and actions of the 
government can influence the patterns of migration. Both of the levels of analysis 
mentioned above disregard the role and the nature of the migration decision making and 
the dynamics behind it. The meso level is the vaguest level of analysis as it looks at 
how people and their ties form a web of connections, either defined as strong or weak. 
The ties between people can be social or symbolic and they can be through families and 
households or even through kin, ethnicity, religion, nationality or political beliefs. Why 
people form those ties can be due to obligation, solidarity, information, control or 
access to resources of others. The fact is that a large portion of research on international 
migration has dealt with questions related to why people choose to migrate while the 
dynamics of migration have been researched to a lesser degree (Faist, 2000).  
How the discipline of demography strives to explain the phenomenon is helpful 
in this case. Demography uses statistics, data and models to look at and determine 
population development. The discipline uses models in order to create forecasts on the 
development, which is useful to a number of other fields of disciplines since population 




growth and decline and its effect is relevant in most research. In order to build the most 
accurate forecasting models, demography seeks out explanatory theories from a range 
of disciplines, making it a certain bridge between the literatures on the subject of 
migration. Demographic analysis can be separated into two categories, social and 
formal demography. The latter is more theoretical which entails the use of simplified 
assumptions. As a result, formal demography is less helpful when it comes to analyzing 
populations where migration is an important flow to and from the population stock. 
Migration is not a simple phenomenon so all attempts to over-simplify it can cause 
errors in any population forecasting models.  On the other hand, social demography 
looks at how social, economic and political forces influence and shape the migration 
flows since researchers using the approach recognize the fact that it cannot be explained 
by one single discipline since there are many factors involved. This approach seeks to 
improve the understanding of the factors that influence all major changes in population 
development, including migration. From that research they estimate which groups of 
people are more likely to migrate than others as well as probability of events (Brettell & 
Hollifield, 2013). 
Economics, as well as demography, uses models in order to help researchers to 
predict scenarios and outcomes and demography has often turned to economic theories 
to explain migration patterns. The economic discipline explains migration with the 
language that they are used to, using terms as demand and supply. The supply side 
represents the people that are ready to migrate and the skills and resources that they 
possess while the demand side is controlled by those institutions that allow for entrance 
and enforce the immigration regulation in a given country.  
Economists assert that migrants choose to move from one place to the other 
mainly because of economic opportunities. These opportunities are measured by 
relative wage differentials, human capital ability differences and the costs of the 
migration process itself. These factors should influence whether people have the 
incentive to move or not, according to economics (Brettell & Hollifield, 2013). 
However, if wage differentials were sufficient to explain the phenomenon of migration, 
the most logical thing would be that the poorest people would have the strongest 
incentive to move. On the contrary, research has shown that that does not represent 
reality (Faist, 2000).  




3.1 Neo-classical economics theory  
The theory assumes that human beings make migration decisions based on their 
expectations of the relative gain. For example, if relative wage gain, or other expected 
benefits exceed the costs of moving to that country, then an individual would be 
inclined to move there. The theory makes the assumption that people have perfect 
information about wage levels and the employment opportunities in the destination 
country and that the migration decision is taken because of economic factors (Castles & 
Miller, 2009). 
Neo-classical economic theory can be divided into two categories, micro and 
macro. The macro approach states that labour moves between two geographically 
distinct markets given that wage differences are seen as beneficial. If there is excess of 
labour supply in one destination, coupled with lower wages, labour will have an 
incentive to move to the destination that lacks labour force and offers higher wages. 
Eventually, the development of increased labour supply in the higher wage destination 
will cause wages to decrease. This process then has the opposite effect in the origin 
destination, as labour force supply decreases due to emigration, wages will increase. 
This development will then continue until emigration costs become equal to the benefits 
of emigrating (Massey et al., 1993). The micro approach allows for the individual 
assessment of the costs and benefits associated with migration. Migration is seen as an 
investment as it ensures higher wages than in the origin destination. Migrants are 
viewed as rational human beings that have the desire to maximize their potentials. Job 
opportunities, the cost of emigrating and other costs associated with migration has to be 
taken into the equation when making a decision (Kupiszewski, 2013). The theory also 
states that migration flows are simply an aggregated sum of individuals that move after 
doing the calculations of the expected benefits of migrating on an individual level. The 
sizes of the migration flow correspond to the relative differences in expected wages and 
migration is said not to occur in the absence of such economic differences (Massey et 
al., 1993).  
As seen in the causal loop diagram in Figure 10, the higher relative expected 
employment opportunities a migrant can expect and the higher relative expected 
income, the more overall expected benefits are associated with migration. The cost of 
emigrating then has the opposite effect, as the higher the cost, the less benefits of 




emigrating. When the expected benefits of migration rise, there should also be a rise in 
the number of people emigrating. However, when emigration increases up to a certain 
level, especially in a country with high unemployment and low wages, two loops are 
introduced. 
 
Figure 10 – A causal loop diagram showing the neo-classical economic theory of migration 
The balancing loop on the left side of Figure 10 states that the more people emigrate, 
the higher the perceived income in the origin country. This happens due to the fact that 
emigration of working age population can cause shortages of labour, resulting in higher 
wages. The relative expected income then decreases as the perceived income in origin 
country increases and the less relative expected income, the less expected benefits of 
migrating and the less people eventually emigrate. However, even though increased 
income in origin country will decrease the relative conditions, the balancing loop can be 
very weak if the perceived income in the destination country continues to grow more 
rapidly than income in the origin country. The loop on the right side has the same 
characteristics but in this case the increased emigration leads to less pressure on the 
labour market, decreasing unemployment and therefore increasing job availability in the 
origin country. 
 This theory, as any other, does not come without shortcomings. It fails to explain 
return migration and researchers like Stark (2003), have been able to demonstrate that 
migration is possible even when wage differentials are not present. This theory also 
excludes the effects of any administrative, political or social conditions that might 
influence the decision making process. Despite its shortcomings, this theory has 
remained one of the most influential theories on migration research (Kupiszewski, 
2013).  




3.2 Network theory 
Even though migration can be initiated due to a variety of reasons, network theory helps 
to explain why the process is sustained over time. Although wage differentials, relative 
employment opportunities or even political dissatisfaction cause people to move, the 
development of the migration process can lead to new causes of migration altogether, 
for example due to spreading of networks. Network theory states that the social links 
we have with others act as an additional pull factor when it comes to migration. Social 
networks connect people together through friendship, family or shared origin 
community (Massey et al., 1993). The social bonds connect people in both origin and 
destination countries as potential migrants connect with former migrants, established 
migrants and so on, all acting as further enhancements of the migration process. People 
use their connections and networks to gain access to employment abroad. When the 
migration network reaches a certain threshold, both the costs and the risks involved in 
migration decrease and as a result, the net expected benefits of migration increase 
(Massey et al., 1993). Therefore, even though initial migration can have taken place due 
to other factors, such as economic situation, migration can be sustained over time 
because the social network will have created a social process in itself that encourages 
migration. The reduced risks and declining costs associated with the growing network 
of migrants abroad encourages migration further (Massey et al., 1993). 
 
Figure 11 – A causal loop diagram of social network theory 
Figure 11 shows a causal loop diagram of network theory and how it can be applied to 
the case of Lithuania. The more Lithuanian migrants abroad, the bigger the social 
network becomes, which then again leads to an increase in migration. The loop is 
reinforcing since all the connections are positive. The other loop is balancing since it 




has a negative relationship which represents the depleting stock of Lithuanians. The 
more migration occurs, the less potential migrants will be left in the stock.  
 The neoclassical theory has proven to be helpful when trying to explain the 
migration phenomenon, but since it fails to take into consideration any political, social 
and administrative effects, it needs to be coupled with another theory when it comes to 
building a model on emigration. In this case, the social network theory proved to be 
well suited as an additional factor since it accounts for some of the other more personal 
aspects in the decision making process. Even though differences in for example wages 
can encourage migration, links or networks are needed to persuade people to take the 
decision to move (Thaut, 2009). 
3.3 Systems approach to migration 
In his publication on migration systems, Oliver Bakewell summarizes the main theories 
that have been established and divides them into categories. The embedded 
functionalist theory states that migration is a process that adjusts itself without outside 
interference, controls or regulation. In other words, that it functions automatically and 
organizes society within a wider social system even though it is sometimes imposed by 
external forces such as regulations. Those who adhere to the theory look at how patterns 
in various migration flows respond to changes in factors such as labour demand, culture 
and the economic conditions in both origin and receiving countries. This is consistent 
with the causal loop diagrams shown above, as they represent self-adjusting feedback 
loops.  There are various shortcomings to this approach, as is common with theories 
within social sciences in general, as it does not draw from empirical data to support its 
claims as well as it does not touch on the subject of distinguishing the groups of people 
that migrate.  
Zlotnik is one of the researchers who has been involved in the debate on 
migration systems and he has written on the skeletal approach, which focuses on the 
challenges that result from attempts to recognize the boundaries of migration systems. 
The approach aims at identifying migration flows between two countries by the political 
and economic relations and of the nation states as well as the strength and duration of 
the observed flows. This approach however offers limited explanations of why the 




flows exist as it is only concerned with the question whether they do exist. As a result 
the approach is able to identify a series of flows and yet ignores influences of feedback 
as well as the human agency involved in the process (Bakewell, 2013). 
Scholars such as Massey and Faist have contributed to the approach of the 
feedback form of migration systems. As the name implies, the feedbacks that take place 
within the system are examined in detail. Massey uses the concept of cumulative 
causation where the feedback mechanisms of choice are the primary drivers. In fact, all 
these theories are based on some sort of feedback mechanisms. 
 When modelling migration flows it is impossible to take into account all the 
different factors that come into play and motivate people to migrate. Historically, we 
could argue that the human being has moved from one place to the next to enhance its 
material well-being or standard of living. When it comes to modelling international 
migration in today’s world, we can speculate whether economic factors in a given 
country present a necessary condition for voluntary mass migration. We can also 
analyze how the political factors influence the shape and size of the migration flows, as 
well as the direction it goes into. It is unlikely that modellers that deal with the 
phenomenon of migration will be able to come up with one general migration model 
that is applicable in any given migration scenario in the world and is able to explain 
immigration, return migration, immobilization and emigration, all in the same model. 
However, it is important for modellers to look at migration in the context of the 
environment it takes place in. Vital factors in that sense are the political liberty enjoyed 
by the population, the scope of social security, wage levels, the degree of political 
corruption perceived by the public, the level of economic performance and the size of 
the shadow economy (Massey & Taylor, 2004). 
Overall, research related to migration has been more focused on immigration, 
and how it affects the receiving countries, rather than emigration and the conditions in 
the origin countries. Research has also leaned more towards studying the causes and 
impacts of migration separately instead of together. Hein de Haas (2010) emphasizes 
the need to research and analyze migration in a broad context with the economic and 
social development that takes place in both the origin and the receiving countries. The 
challenge is to recognize the boundaries of the effects that migration has on societal 
development and in return, how that overall development affects the dynamics of 
migration (de Haas, 2010). 




The computer model used in this thesis is built around two migration theories in 
particular, the social-network theory and the neo-classical economics theory. It uses an 
input from the embedded functionalist theory in the sense that it is self-adjusting and 
functions automatically but external forces can influence the system. 
 




4. DATA ANALYSIS  
There is reason to believe that different mechanics are at work at different points in 
time that control the migration patterns in Lithuania. Major external events that 
influenced migration flows to and from the country were the regaining of independence 
in 1990, the accession to the EU in 2004, implementation of the Schengen agreement in 
2007, and there is reason to believe that the flows were affected by the global economic 
crisis that hit in 2008 (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2014).  
 The period of labour migration starts from the mid-1990s but the flows were 
mainly illegal from the perspective of destination countries, since they did not allow 
free inflow of people from Lithuania until the country joined the EU. Lithuanians had 
waited for their freedom from the Soviet Union for a long time and when it finally came 
people had formed certain expectations about how things would be from then on. The 
anticipated economic wealth and success did not happen at once and the country 
experienced high unemployment in the 1990s. There had been over-employment in the 
labour market as the country was under the rule of communism. Transitioning into a 
market economy meant that industries and other sectors such as agriculture were being 
modernised, resulting in less need for labour. This hit the country hard economically 
and there was great uncertainty about what the future would bring. Lithuanians probably 
saw migration as their way of reducing financial risks for their families under the 
transition (Thaut, 2009).  
 
Figure 12 – Peaks of emigration clear around EU accession and global economic crisis. Comparison of emigration 
flows from Lithuania over time to major destination countries. Source: Statistics Lithuania and SSB. 




When we look at the graph in Figure 12 we see two distinct peaks of emigration into the 
major destination countries. The first one after Lithuania joined the EU in 2004 and the 
second one following the global economic crisis in 2008. Unemployment rate in 
Lithuania peaked at 17.3% in 2001 and still the emigration flow out of the country does 
not show a big increase that year. After the EU accession in 2004, the only countries 
that did not opt for transition restriction on labour migrants were the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Sweden but Sweden is not considered further in this analysis since it has not 
been one of the major destination countries. Given the restrictions from other EU 
countries and the good economic conditions of United Kingdom and Ireland it came as 
no surprise that those countries became the major destinations for emigrants from 
Lithuania (Elsner, 2012).  The fact that English is the native language in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom has also made them attractive destinations for educated people, since 
English has become such a widespread language. This however is not included as a 
driving factor in the model even though in reality, language is likely to have an effect on 
people's preferences when it comes to choosing a destination. 
  The graph shown here above shows that the emigration flows go from being 
mainly directed to Germany in the beginning of the decade to being directed to the 
European countries that opened up their boarders to Lithuanian emigrants after the 
country’s accession to the EU. The emigration flows are also increasing overall in the 
last few years, indicating that there are greater mobility opportunities for Lithuanians 
within the EU now than before (Thaut, 2009).   
 But what is interesting about the change in the flows is whether we are able to 
detect some common denominator in the major destination countries that can explain 
the shift in the flow and also its increasing magnitude. In her analysis on Lithuanian 
migration, Thaut (2009) stated that the primary determinants of emigration out of 
Lithuania were a combination of the demand and supply side factors that we know from 
neo-classical migration theory. On the demand side we have the labour shortages, 
decline in working age population and desire for cheap labour in Western European 
countries that then attracts Lithuanian labour migrants. At the same time, higher 
unemployment level, lower wages and the less developed economic conditions in 
Lithuania act as a push factor. The expanding network that links migrants with potential 
migrants then acts as a further enhancement of that development.  




The different levels of unemployment between Lithuania and other European 
countries can work as an incentive to emigrate. When surplus of labour and high 
unemployment in the sending country is coupled with labour shortages and low 
unemployment in the receiving country, there is a clear indication that this has a major 
effect on people’s decision to migrate. In fact, a survey conducted by RAIT in 2005, a 
Lithuanian market research and analysis company, the respondents indicated that 
unemployment in Lithuania was an important factor in their decisions to migrate to 
another country. 
 
Figure 13 – Unemployment rate in the major destination countries relative to Lithuania. Source: Eurostat 
Figure 13 shows how unemployment rate has developed from 2001-2013 in Lithuania 
relative to the major destination countries. If the country has relative unemployment rate 
lower than 1, the unemployment rate is lower than in Lithuania and vice versa. If we 
compare the graph with the one we have in Figure 12 we see that the emigration peaks 
in 2005 and 2010 align with valleys in relative unemployment, especially for the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. Between 2005 and 2008 when the relative unemployment rate 
increases in all destination countries except for Norway, the emigration flows to those 
countries decline. Norway has the best relative unemployment rate out of all the 
countries from 2006 onwards and at that time, emigration to Norway starts to slowly 
increase. Norway is considered to have been less effected by the global economic crisis 
in 2008 than other European countries and after 2011, the emigration flow to Norway is  
the second highest one from Lithuania, with only the flow into the United Kingdom 
succeeding it.  
 





Figure 14 - Emigration flow out of Lithuania as a function of unemployment rate for 2004-2013. Correlation factor 
0.673. Source: Statistics Lithuania. 
The scatter graphs in Figure 14 show the emigration flow out of Lithuania as a function 
of the unemployment rate in the country after the EU accession in 2004. A trend line 
has been added in the graph for further visualization.  The correlation factor in the graph 
is 0.673 which is still not high enough to completely explain the emigration pattern. 
 When we look closer at the demographic group that comprises the majority of 
the emigration flow out of Lithuania, which is the youngest working age population 
between the ages 15 to 24, we see that the average unemployment rate is actually double 
the national average (Thaut, 2009). This age group is considered the most mobile one so 
it does not come as a surprise that the data indicates that growing unemployment in the 
group coincides with growing emigration flows. 
Figure 15 shows little or no correlation between unemployment rate in the 
destination countries, relative to Lithuania, and the emigration flows to said countries.  
 
Figure 15 - Emigration flows to the major destination countries as a function of relative unemployment rate in those 
countries for 2001-2013 showing little or no correlation between the two. Data: Eurostat and Statistics Lithuania 
That could mean, that even though the emigration flow out of Lithuania seems to be 
sensitive to the unemployment rate in the country, the destination country may not be 




chosen from that criteria. It also indicates that the strength of the relative unemployment 
rate does not necessarily drive which destination is chosen, as long as unemployment is 
lower than in Lithuania, as seen by the fact that the majority of the emigration flows are 
higher when relative unemployment rate is lower than 1. So to fully explain the choice 
of a destination country, we need to factor in other criteria such as relative employment 
opportunities. 
 The relative income differentials between Lithuania and other EU countries could 
also be playing an essential part in encouraging Lithuanian labour emigration. In the 
formerly mentioned 2005 RAIT survey, the respondents identified low income as the 
biggest incentive for migration from Lithuania, but around 90% of them mentioned that 
income was the most important consideration for them when it came to making the 
decision to migrate (Thaut, 2009).  
Table 1 – Difference in monthly average income and minimum income in EU countries in 2004 in Litas. Average 
income relative to Lithuania. Source: Thaut, 2009. 
Country Minimum income Average income 
Average income 
relative to Lithuania 
United Kingdom 4233.1 11860.4 9.0 
Ireland 4188.2 8314.3 6.3 
Spain 1771.3 4492.1 3.4 
Lithuania 500.0 1310.1 1.0 
 
As you can see in Table 1, both the minimum income and the average income that a 
person can earn per month in Lithuania in 2004 is much lower than in some of the 
major destination countries. This comparison shows that relative income comparison 
can act as a major push factor for people considering migration as the financial benefits 
could be immense. 
 
Figure 16 – Relative annual income development over time. Annual average income adjusted for PPP in US dollars 
in Lithuania from 2000-2013 relative to the major destination countries. Source: Statistics Lithuania and OECD. 




When looking at the annual average income in Lithuania adjusted for purchasing power 
relative to the major destination countries in Figure 16 we see that the overall 
development is that the difference in income is getting smaller. Lithuania is catching up 
with the major destination countries especially following the EU accession, with the 
development taking a small setback after the global economic crisis. If the relative 
income was the only contributor to emigration from Lithuania the emigration flows 
should be declining. Since that is not the case it indicates that relative income alone is 
not sufficient in explaining migration flows and other factors need to be considered as 
well, such as the unemployment rate or social networks.  
 When we look at some economic indicators we can gain insights into how 
Lithuania compares to other countries when it comes to general economic development 
of the country. Comparing the annual social expenditures of the countries gives us an 
idea of the level of social welfare that the citizens enjoy in their country.  In the graphs 
in Figure 17 and 18 we see how relative annual social expenditure per capita and 
relative GDP per capita have been developing since 2001. Lithuania is consistently 
below the other countries in both aspects. 
 
 
Figure 17 –Relative GDP per capita over time. Comparison of GDP per capita measured in US dollars. Source: 
The World Bank 





Figure 18 – Relative social expenditure over time. Comparison of annual social expenditure per person in Euros in 
major destination countries relative to Lithuania. Source: Eurostat 
As mentioned earlier, Thaut (2009) says that the development in the migration trend 
due to supply-demand and push and pull factors can be further enhanced by social 
networking. In order to see if any evidence can be found in the data that could reinforce 
that theory, the variables of the stocks of Lithuanians in a given country and the flows 
into that country were set up in a scatter graph to give visual results. The graphs in 
Figure 19 and 20 show the correlation between the stock of Lithuanians and the inflows 
of them into Norway and the United Kingdom, lagging by one year. 
 
For Norway we have data from 2001 to 2013 for both the inflow and the stock and for 
the United Kingdom we only have data where we are able to compare the stock to the 
flow in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2011. In both cases we see some evidence of correlation 
between the size of the stock and the magnitude of the flows. However, there is not 
enough data to conclude a correlation with statistical significance.   
 After having looked at relative unemployment rates, relative income and the size of 
the Lithuanian population abroad we are not able to say that any of those factors could 
by themselves explain migration but they all seem to have an effect. 
 
Figure 19 - Correlation between the flow of and the 
stock of Lithuanians in Norway. Source: SSB. 
 
Figure 20 - Correlation between the flow of and 
the stock of Lithuanians in the UK. Source: 
Statistics Lithuania. 




5. THE MIGRATION MODEL 
In this chapter the simulation models´ structure will be shown and explained how the 
different theories applied are used in the model. The three different sectors of the model 
will be explained in detail and the interactions between them. These sectors are the 
population-, economic- and social network sectors. Further documentation from the 
model can be found in Appendix A. 
5.1 The model structure  
The neo-classical economic theory tells us that migrants look at the differences in 
income and job opportunities between two countries so it focuses on the economic 
aspect of the decision making. Social network theory adds on to that theory by saying 
that even though migration processes can be initiated by those factors, social networks 
further enhance the process and sustain it over time. 
 
Figure 21 – A causal loop diagram of the theory behind the model 
The model is built around that approach and in Figure 21 a causal loop diagram shows 
the two theories combined. In addition to the previously introduced loops in the social 
network chapter (see Figure 11, chapter 3.2), a new reinforcing loop, called R2, is 
introduced. The growing stock of Lithuanians abroad increases the social network 
which then decreases the costs of emigration and therefore the expected benefits of 
emigration increase. On the economic side of the model there is one balancing loop, B2. 
Increased emigration leads to less labour force in Lithuania which then again reduces 




unemployment. Decreased unemployment can cause income to rise, which leads to a 
decrease in the relative expected income and increases the expected benefits of 
emigration. In theory, reduced unemployment in Lithuania reduces the relative expected 
job opportunities which then decreases the expected benefits of emigration. The link 
between unemployment and relative expected job opportunities is dashed since it is 
exogenous in the model. Therefore, we do not assign the loop a name. 
 The dynamics of the model are therefore highly dependent on the balance between 
these loops. The social network sector enticing effect on emigration and the balancing 
dynamics of the economic sector. The balancing loop of the economic sector is highly 
dependent on the relative situation in Lithuania compared to other countries and is 
therefore weak when other countries are doing better than Lithuania.  
5.1.1 Population sector 
Since the purpose of the model is to capture the dynamics behind emigration we need to 
incorporate a population sector with an aging chain and migration flows. There are 
three major stocks in the model that keep track of the people involved in the migration 
process. That is the stock of Adults not interested in migrating, Adults interested in 
migrating and the stock of Lithuanian migrants abroad. Since the children are not 
involved in the decision making process of migrating, they are not included in these 
stocks. However, due to the importance of the stock of children on overall population 
development, we include a structure for children as a side calculation in the model, seen 
on the right side on Figure 22.  
 The stock of children is increased by births and immigration and decreased by 
deaths, emigration and maturation. Births are dependent on the fertility rate, driven by 
data and the fertile population. We use the stocks of Adults interested and Adults not 
interested in migration to derive the fertile population. Children deaths, immigration 
and emigration is driven by fractional rates that are taken from data. The maturation 
flow of children becoming adults is affected by the time to become an adult, which is 
15 years. That flow is then introduced as a ghost into the migration population sector on 
the left side of Figure 22. Note that the children structure is not divided into groups by 
gender. 





Figure 22 – The population sector of the model. To the left the aging chain and migration flows and to the right the 
children structure. 
The stock of Adults not interested in migration is divided into groups by gender and 
age. The age groups are 15 to 29 year olds, 30 to 44 year olds, 45 to 59 year olds and 
those that are aged 60 and above. These age groups were chosen since emigration rates 
decline as people grow older and the dynamics of emigration would therefore be 
approached in a more realistic way. The age group of 15 to 29 year olds has the inflow 
of children becoming adult where 50% of them are male and 50% female. Maturation 
between the age groups in the stock happen through the age transition flows. When 
people from the age group of 15 to 29 maturate into the next age group above after a 
maturation time, they then flow into that age group and so on. The age group of 60 and 
above does not have any maturation outflow since that is the oldest age group. The 
inflow of people into that age group is the outflow of the age group of 45 to 59 year 
olds. Deaths are controlled by the fractional death rate for each age group, but the 
deaths for the age group of 60 and above are controlled by the average lifetime 
expectancy after the age of 60, depending on gender.  
 The stock of Adults interested in migration is also divided by gender and age 
groups. Deaths and maturation between age groups are calculated in the same way as in 
the stock of Adults not interested in migration. People move from the stock of Adults 
not interested in migration into the stock of Adults interested in migration by the flow 
Becoming interested. That flow is controlled by the Fractional getting interested rate, 




which is an estimate of the ratio of people considering to emigrate. The outflow from 
the stock of Adults interested in migration is the labour emigration flow. The flow is 
controlled by both the social network and the relative economic situation in Lithuania 
compared to the major destination countries. 
 People move into the stock of Lithuanians abroad by the labour emigration flow, 
which is divided into the major destination countries, age groups and gender. Deaths 
and age maturation between age groups are calculated in the same way as in the other 
two stocks. The return migration flow brings people from the stock of Lithuanians 
abroad and back into the stock of Adults not interested in migration. The return 
migration flow is controlled by the average time abroad, which is affected by the 
economic situation in each country. The better the situation, the more likely it is that 
people stay longer in that given country. Data in this sector is retrieved mainly from 
demographic yearbooks published by Statistics Lithuania. 
5.1.2 Economic sector 
As previously explained, the economic sector of the model is based on the neo-classical 
economic theory. Here the relative wages and the relative employment opportunities are 
the two factors driving emigration. The relative economic situation due to income is the 
net expected annual income in the major destination countries divided by the expected 
annual income in Lithuania, with an emphasis on the word "expected". The 
unemployment rates in Lithuania and the destination countries act as a factor that 
reduces the probability of getting the total expected annual income. The net annual 
expected income in other countries is the expected income minus the expected costs of 
emigrating. The average annual income in Lithuania and in the other countries are all 
exogenous drivers in the model, as well as unemployment levels abroad. The 
employment variable represents the number of people having a job in Lithuania and the 
labour force participation rate represents the percentage of people at a working age that 
are active in the labour market, but both of these variables are exogenous. The 
dynamics behind either the economic development abroad or in Lithuania are outside 
the scope of the model. The economic sector can be seen in Figure 23. 
 





Figure 23 – The economic sector of the model 
Job vacancies in both Lithuania and the other countries in question are exogenous to the 
model and combine to create relative employment opportunities in the destination 
countries versus Lithuania. Even though unemployment rates in Lithuania and the UK 
for example would be rather similar, it does not mean that employment opportunities in 
the countries are the same. Lithuania has only around 3 million residents while the UK 
has around 63 million residents. The number of job vacancies in the UK are therefore 
much higher than in Lithuania and that needs to be taken into account in the model. As 
shown in the causal loop diagram in Figure 21, the relative employment opportunities 
do not affect the expected benefits of migrating, rather it acts as a multiplication factor 
for the emigration fractional rate. The effect of relative employment opportunities is 
introduced to compensate for the difference in the sizes of the countries involved. In 
order to combine the two factors, the relative job opportunities and the relative annual 
income, they are tuned on a curve and multiplied to give either an amplification or 
dampening effect on the normal emigration rate. This gives the fractional rate of people 
emigrating due to economic effects, emigration fractional rate. The net expected annual 
income abroad is reduced by the cost of emigrating, which is represented by the 
emigration cost index seen in Figure 24. In a recent study by Dmytro Vikhrov (2013) 
financed by the European Union, migration costs are analysed in relation to migration 
flows. 





Figure 24 – The emigration cost index 
The study says that emigration costs can be divided into physical costs, the costs of 
obtaining information, the costs of social exclusion and costs associated with 
overcoming barriers due to immigration policies. The physical costs include costs such 
as transportation and visa fees. The study chose the airline deregulation index to 
represent the reduced costs associated with physical costs since transportation has 
become cheaper over the years due to increased market competition. The costs of 
obtaining information is reduced by the internet penetration rate since technology has 
made it easier for potential migrants to familiarize themselves with conditions in a 
destination country. The costs of social exclusion are reduced by the extent of the social 
network of migrants in the country since connections to other people that share the 
same language and national identity in a destination country reduces the risk of social 
isolation. The stock of Lithuanian migrants abroad therefore affects the costs of social 
exclusion (Vikhrov, 2013). Immigration policies have acted as a barrier for migration of 
Lithuanians into the major destination countries, making it mostly illegal in nature 
before the country joined the EU. Norway and Germany allowed free movement of 
Lithuanian migrants in 2007, Spain in 2006 and the UK and Ireland in 2004. The 
psychological costs of immigrating into those countries therefore goes down 
significantly after that time since migration becomes legal. Since it is too vague to put a 
monetary value on all those factors, the emigration costs become an index between 0 
and 1. The expected annual income abroad is then multiplied by the index to account 
for the reduction of the net benefits. 
 




5.1.3 Social network sector 
The social network sector of the model is based on the network theory, which states that 
the larger a network becomes, the incentive for people to migrate becomes greater. The 
social network sector of the model can be seen in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25 – The social network sector of the model 
The extent of the network of Lithuanian migrants in a destination country has an effect 
on integration and psychological costs, meaning that the bigger the network, the less 
risk of social exclusion there is. The network of Lithuanians abroad is used as a 
connection to employment opportunities abroad, making emigration less risky at the 
same time. The model structure in the social network sector is drawn from the epidemic 
system dynamics model (Glass-Husain, 1991). 
 Lithuanian migrants abroad have a certain amount of contacts with people in 
Lithuania per year. Those who are considered “susceptible” for migration are those who 
are interested in migration. Contacts with susceptible people translates into an 
emigration rate due to network which influences the labour emigration flow. The major 
reinforcing loop in the sector can be seen in the structure in Figure 25. The larger the 
stock of Lithuanian migrants, the more contacts with susceptible people will take place, 
meaning that the emigration rate due to network will increase. The labour emigration 




rate will therefore increase as well and eventually the stock of Lithuanians abroad will 
grow larger. The getting interested rate is also important in this loop since the more 
people that are susceptible, the more emigration will take place. The fractional getting 
interested rate is estimated for each for age but ideally, non-interested people could 
become interested in migration through a contact with a Lithuanian migrant, but this is 
not included in the model. 
 The overall structure of the model can be seen in Figure 26 where all those sectors 
are combined. The economic sector combined with the social network sector draws 
from components in the model to generate the Labour emigration flow. Data within the 
model is taken from Statistics Lithuania, statistics agencies in the destination countries, 
OECD, Eurostat and the World Bank. 
 
Figure 26 – The complete emigration model of Lithuania 




5.2 Behaviour of the model 
In Figures 27-30, the total population and the emigration flow are compared with 
historical data. That is done in order to validate that the structure of the model is 
representative of the problem at hand. In Figure 27 the population developments 
between 2001 and 2013 are shown and the model proves to be representative in the 
sense that it manages to follow the trend of the data. 
 
Figure 27- Simulated population development compared to historical data. 
The reference mode used in this case is the total emigration flow out of Lithuania. The 
thesis is focused on explaining the dynamics behind labour emigration. In the total 
emigration flow the historical migration to Russia is included as an exogenous input 
since it is most likely of other nature than labour emigration. This input is minimal 
compared with labour emigration. Emigration to countries other than the major 
destination countries and Russia are omitted. 
 
Figure 28 - Simulated total emigration over time compared to the reference mode. 




Figure 28 shows the simulated total emigration between 2001 and 2013 compared with 
the reference mode of the total emigration flow. As we can see, the model does not 
replicate the reference mode perfectly. The model succeeds at generating a step in 
emigration after 2004 sustaining the emigration between 2005 and 2009 and then a drop 
in emigration occurs. This drop in emigration after 2009 in the model can be traced  
back to an increase in wages in Lithuania, rising unemployment rates in the destination 
countries and a decline in annual income in some of the destination countries.  
 In order to have a better understanding of the dynamics in the model we look at 
the behaviour of important loops individually. In Figure 29 the social network loop of 
the model has been disabled so the total emigration that we see consists only of 
dynamics from the economic sector. We see peaks in 2005 and 2009. When the effect 
of employment opportunities is disabled as well, we see that the relative income is the 
main contributor to the peaks in the behaviour of the economic sector.  
 
Figure 29 - Simulated total emigration without the network loop compared to the reference mode 
When the economic loop of the model is disabled, it only generates emigration due to 
social networking. As Lithuanians abroad increase, following the peak in 2005, the 
migration due to social networking increases and peaks approximately 3 years later as 
seen in Figure 30. As expected, migration due to social networking works as an 
amplifier on the migration due to economic situation. The drop in the curve can be 
traced back to the effect of the balancing loop B1 in Figure 21 where the increased 
emigration drains the pool of potential emigrants. 
 





Figure 30 - Simulated total emigration without the economic loop compared to the reference mode 
Running the model until 2050 reveals that the Lithuanian population continues to 
decrease as well as the labour force. Labour force emigration is going to be declining, 
but still remains high. The ratio of the people over 60 versus the adult population 
continues to grow. When we include simulations of forecasts for future fertility rates, 
we see that it has an effect on the development of the total labour force in Lithuania, 
seen in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31 - Forecasts for the development of the total labour force under different fertility forecasts from 2013 to 
2050. 
If fertility rates stay at same level as 2013, at 1.59, we could expect a decrease in the 
labour force to around 1.05 million people by 2050. If the fertility rates increase from 
2015 up to 1.9 in 2050 the labour force still drops to a number around 1.1 million. 
When fertility rates decrease gradually to 1.3 by 2050 the most drastic decline of the 
labour force occurs, making it slightly above 1.0 million. If we look at Jorgen Randers 
forecast on global development over the next forty years, we see that he estimates that 
the trend of declining fertility rates will continue (Randers, 2012). That means that the 




most drastic decline in the labour force seen on the graph could be the most likely 
scenario. 
5.3 Limitations of the model 
There are difficulties involved when modelling a phenomenon as complicated as 
migration. Simplifications and generalizations are needed in order to create a computer 
model but at the same time limit the ability of the model to replicate reality since human 
decision making is complex. The goal was however not to form any complete model 
explaining migration, but to use it to better understand the dynamics of labour force 
emigration in Lithuania. The model boundaries are limited to labour emigration out of 
Lithuania where economic conditions in the destination countries are exogenous. 
Economic factors in Lithuania, such as job vacancies and average annual income, are 
also exogenous as the model does not explain how they are determined over time. 
Demographic determinants, such as death rates and fertility rates are also exogenous 
since the model is only meant to replicate mechanisms that influence labour emigration. 
A clear limitation to the model is that it does not replicate the reference mode perfectly, 
which is the emigration flow out of Lithuania.  
The parameters that the model is sensitive to include the probability of 
emigration if contacted, the fraction of adults becoming interested in migration, the 
normal average time spent abroad and contacts per year. It is a clear weakness of the 
model that these parameters are highly uncertain. The Emigration cost index includes 
the psychological costs associated with emigration as well as the immigration policy 
barriers but they are difficult to include in the model and need further research. 
Using annual average income and unemployment rates for the probability of an 
expected income could give a false image of the reality since the probability for 
unemployed people to get work is less than for a person chosen at random from the 
labour force. The same is true when comparing the expected income in various 
countries since unemployed people are likely to earn less than the average. However, 
since the same is probably true for both destination countries and the origin country we 
use this approach as an approximation of the reality. As long as the error is the same in 
both origin and destination country the relative comparison is considered valid. 




6. POLICY ANALYSIS 
6.1 Background information  
As mentioned before, migration research has primarily evolved around immigration 
rather than emigration and the effects on the destination country rather than the origin 
country. This also applies when it comes to policy research on migration (Kupiszewski, 
2013). Management of migration flows has become an issue that is high on the political 
agenda in most developed countries. The projections of aging populations in the OECD 
countries coupled with anticipated labour shortages will most likely drive international 
migration flows from developing countries into the developed ones. The gap in income 
and standard-of-living between developed countries and those that are considered 
developing, will keep on ensuring that there is an incentive within the system to 
migrate. Migration is considered to be a positive phenomenon both for sending and 
receiving countries if it can be managed properly. For sending countries, migration can 
entail economic growth, investment opportunities, growth of human capital and a 
decrease in poverty, but only if the country is able to restructure the economy in 
accordance with emigration and ensure a distribution of the benefits that come with it. 
Migration is a complex issue and policy makers need to be well aware of the linkages it 
has into the economic and social spheres in the countries involved (Katseli, Lucas, & 
Xenogiani, 2006). 
 When it comes to immigration flows, politicians often are put in an awkward 
position. The labour market might benefit greatly from increased immigration while the 
public discourse is against it. European welfare states see immigration both as a 
solution and a challenge. The demographic pressures on the welfare system caused by 
aging population can be largely alleviated by increased immigration while that same 
immigration is often blamed for the economic difficulties that governments are facing 
when keeping up a generous welfare state. There is always a certain level of frustration 
when the goals of a policy and its outcome do not match. Migration policies can 
influence migration flows greatly, both the demographic composition of the flow as 
well as its magnitude. There are contradictions between the reality in developed 




countries and the immigration policies practiced there. The goals are seldom reached 
and often the total opposite of what was intended turns out to be the outcome. In 
general, the migration policy that is practiced in Europe is mainly catered to efforts to 
get the "right people" in, instead of minimizing immigration. The policy is often aimed 
at being responsive to the needs of the labour market, weather it is getting high skilled 
workers or low skilled seasonal workers into the country. Other common components 
of the European migration policy are to combat illegal migration, limiting abuse to the 
asylum system and offer integration measures (Massey & Taylor, 2004). 
6.2 Current and former migration policies in Lithuania 
Lithuania had a restrictive migration policy while the country was under the rule of the 
Soviet Union. Both immigration and emigration were illegal at the time and controlled 
by the USSR, which changed after the fall of communism. When the country joined the 
EU it in fact had a big impact on the migration policy in Lithuania. Free movement of 
people within the EU applied for Lithuanians which lifted all previous restrictions of 
migration (Kupiszewski, 2013). 
 The Lithuanian government has taken some measures to combat the growing 
demographic pressures in the country due to the high emigration flows. In 2006 the 
country started to experience labour shortages and in the next year, the government 
approved the Economic Migration Regulation Strategy. It was focused on mitigating the 
negative effects of emigration in the country and to provide incentives for Lithuanians 
residing abroad to return (European Migration Network, 2013b). In 2008, the 
government adopted the Immigration Policy Guidelines which was meant to further 
support the Economic Migration Regulatory Strategy. It specifically covers issues such 
as economic immigration, illegal migration and integration. The main objectives of the 
policy were to ensure that Lithuania managed to minimize labour shortages, avoid the 
negative effects of emigration and an aging population on social development and 
public finances, effectively manage migration flows to and from the country and 
participate actively in the EU's immigration policy-making process. In order to achieve 
those goals, the strategy included principles that should be followed. They include for 
example measures to only employ third country nationals if labour force from Lithuania 




or other EU countries are unavailable. In addition to that, immigration should be based 
on selectivity and flexibility to ensure a match between labour demand and migrant 
flows. The policy recommended looking to countries that have strong ties with 
Lithuania, such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and countries from the Southern 
Caucasus region. Integration efforts should be enhanced, such as Lithuanian language 
courses. However, increasing immigration should be secondary and efforts to encourage 
return migration should be continued. Agencies within the public sphere that deal with 
these issues also needed to cooperate more to enhance the effectiveness of the policy. 
There was no monitoring system included in the document which allowed for 
evaluation of the progress of the strategy. Another measure to tackle migration issues 
was a strategy, approved in 2011, called Global Lithuania Strategy, where further 
emphasis was put on encouraging return migration. This strategy included concrete 
evaluation criteria and a re-evaluation is scheduled to take place in 2019 (European 
Migration Network, 2013a). 
 Although the Immigration Policy Guidelines were approved in 2008, an additional 
resolution was made in 2014, on approval of the Lithuanian Migration policy 
guidelines. The document was intended to "establish the objectives, principles and 
direction of Lithuanian migration policy and to ensure proper control of migration 
processes". In order to do that the Government of Lithuania would approve the 
Lithuanian Migration Policy Guidelines and to establish that the provisions of the 
previously mentioned Immigration Policy Guidelines would be complied with by 
ministries and institutions. It should also be recommended to all municipalities to align 
their actions in pursuance of those guidelines. The document does not specify how this 
will be done. The main objectives of the migration policy were to gradually reduce 
mass emigration and to increase circular migration, ensure that the policy for attracting 
labour force met the demands of the labour market, combat illegal migration and create 
and develop an integration system for foreigners. The policy document specifies that 
immigration of third country nationals should not stimulate Lithuanians to migrate to 
other countries. It would also be necessary to address the growing negative attitude 
towards immigrants in the public discourse and reduce prevalence of xenophobia and 
discrimination within the society. In order to increase the attractiveness of Lithuania as 
a destination country, measures should be taken to improve procedures regarding for 
example residence and work permits. The policy guidelines, different from the ones 




approved in 2008, included evaluation criteria and which agencies are responsible for 
providing information on the criteria. Information of how the objectives will be 
accomplished is however very vaguely mentioned as well as what actions the 
government plans to take. For example, the issue of reducing youth unemployment, and 
how it needs attention, is brought up, without mentioning what measures will be taken 
in order to accomplish that (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014). 
 Dr. Karolis Žibas, junior research fellow at the Ethnic Research Institute, criticized 
Lithuania's migration policy in 2013 and stated in an interview that: "In fact, Lithuania 
does not have a long-term immigration strategy, there's only an administrative apparatus 
issuing work and residency permits" (Digryté, 2013). The new Migration Policy 
Guidelines were approved in 2014 so even though it offers some signs of a move in the 
right direction of the government of Lithuania, it still has to come to light weather the 
measures will bring about positive outcomes. It seems as if the migration issue, that 
appeared high on the political agenda in the years before the economic crisis in 2008, 
lost funding and resources in the following recession years. The policy guidelines from 
2014 indicate that the government is ready to put further efforts into analyzing and 
tackling the issue of mass emigration. Former policy measures directed at the issue 
might have had some effects on the trend, but it does not change the fact that there are 
no indicators that the emigration trend is halting, making the former policies sound 
more like policy wishes than actual actions. 
6.3 Policy options 
Richard Elmore (1979) distinguishes between two approaches to policy making, which 
he calls forward and backward mapping. He defines forward mapping as a policy 
process that is initiated by a political statement by a government that an action will be 
taken on a certain issue. Detailed steps of implementation are then outlined and in the 
end, the intended outcome is defined as well as how its success should be measured. 
This approach assumes that positive results can be achieved through control and 
authority. It relies on the organizational structures within the administrative bodies, 
regulations, funding and authoritative relationships within the public sector in order to 
implement the policy and see it succeed. 




 When it comes to backward mapping, it is essential that the problematic behaviour 
that needs to change is clearly specified. We go all the way down the line to the actor 
itself and what behaviour it is that is proving to be so problematic that a policy needs to 
be designed to alleviate it. Only when the problematic behaviour is clear can we start to 
think of a course of action. Next, we need to recognize the organization that is most 
likely to have the best chance of successfully implementing the policy and which effects 
it will have. The administrative unit chosen for the job will then be analyzed with 
regards to which extent it is capable of changing the problematic behaviour. Resources 
needed for the unit to do the job are then outlined (Elmore, 1979).  
 In the case of Lithuania, there can be many aspects of the emigration problem so 
policy makers need to be clear on their intent. What is the main problematic behaviour 
at hand? Is it that people are leaving the country? Is it that people are leaving and not 
coming back? Is it that working age population is declining in the country? Is it that 
labour force participation is too low to provide enough workforce for the economy? The 
solution should be tailored to what is defined as the problematic behaviour. If the 
problem is simply that the country needs more people at a working age that can be 
solved simply with increased immigration of foreigners. If the problem is that people 
are simply leaving the country, the government can focus on policy measures aimed at 
getting people to stay in the country. If however, the problem is that emigrants are not 
returning from abroad, that is an issue that needs another solution. In this case, it seems 
that most policy measures taken by the government are focused above all on the low 
return migration rate. Emigration in itself is not seen as a negative thing, but something 
that could actually benefit Lithuanian society, if properly managed. The shortage of 
workforce is seen as a side effect of the low return rate and immigration is mainly seen 
as a short-term measure. 
 In the Lithuanian Migration Policy Guidelines, approved in 2014, the government 
mentions a few objectives in order to alleviate the problem of mass emigration in 
Lithuania. The three major flows of migration in and out of the country are mentioned, 
emigration, immigration and return migration. The migration policy has the objectives 
to decrease emigration, encourage return migration and to increase immigration if the 
labour market needs workforce. In order to decrease emigration, measures need to be 
taken towards eliminating negative social and economic factors that encourage 
migration and youth unemployment is an important part of that. In regards to return 




migration, measures are needed to enhance cooperation with the destination countries, 
mobilize Lithuanians abroad to keep their ties with their homeland, provide 
consultation and support to those who return or contemplate returning as well as offer 
measures to integrate them into the labour market (Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania, 2014). 
6.3.1 Return migration 
When a country that has received large inflows of migrants experiences an economic 
downturn, it can lead to a process where the migrants move back to their origin country. 
No country has been totally successful in economically and socially integrating those 
who return. In order to accomplish that, it has to be done with holistic policies that are 
aimed at the population in general, that offer benefits to return migrants as a side effect. 
Policies that are especially aimed at return migrants could possibly bring about some 
resentment within the public and cause others to see return migrants as a group that is 
getting a special treatment by the government (Massey & Taylor, 2004). 
 One of the possible policy measures the government of Lithuania can take in order 
to combat the issue of emigration, is to encourage return migration. The government 
seems to be well aware of that approach since most of the approved policy guidelines 
evolve around return migration and as a primary approach, with immigration as a 
secondary approach. It is essential for the country that the likelihood of return migration 
should be increased, but studies show that the odds of return diminish considerably 
when people stay abroad for 3 years or longer (Thaut, 2009). According to Thaut, 
attempts should not be made to control the on-going migration trend by the origin 
country through restrictive policies. The migration flows are driven by structural forces 
and micro level processes. Emigration in itself should not be seen as a negative thing; it 
can in fact increase the expected return on education investments in case of short term 
migration and result in a brain gain for the origin country. Return migrants will raise the 
human capital of a country, given that they are able to make use of their newly required 
skills, knowledge and income, which could in general have a positive effect of a 
country's socio-economic development. The optimal way for societies to gain from 
migration and reduce the emigration push effect is to develop targeted policy measures, 
including making return migration more attractive (Thaut, 2009). 




 The government of Lithuania has however not been able to create the right 
environment for return migrants to make use of their newly acquired skills. It has been 
estimated that in recent years, around 40% of all return migrants have been 
economically inactive after returning to Lithuania (Hazans & Philips, 2011). It seems 
therefore that the government has not been successful up to this point to create an 
environment to harness the skills of these individuals and re-integrate them into the 
labour market. The government mentions that migrants usually get jobs that are below 
their qualifications possible as reason for this development. When educational levels of 
a migrant do not correspond to his work experience abroad it could be that an employer 
does not see the value in employing them. A failure to re-integrate return migrants into 
the labour market will entail the danger of re-emigration, which is exactly something 
that the government is interested in changing.  
 A policy aimed at increasing incentives for return migration could be increasing job 
opportunities for educated people. The fact that many of those emigrating are young, 
educated people who have been unemployed prior to departure suggests that the job 
opportunities for the group is lacking. When we look at investments in the private 
sector in Lithuania, we see that it is low, especially when it comes to innovation and 
research. This could have a negative effect of the growth of the economy in the long run 
(European Commission, 2015a). The EU 2020 targets set forward by the European 
Union include increasing investment in research and development to 3% of GDP. 
Lithuania currently spends 0.95% of its GDP towards the category but aims to increase 
it to 1.9% (European Commission, 2015b). Investment in innovation and research can 
have positive effects on competitiveness and growth of an economy, as Finland 
managed to prove, but they did just that following their economic crisis during the first 
half of the 1990s (OECD, 2009).  
 Implementing a policy evolving around investing in start-up companies could help 
the country achieve its goal. There already seem to be start-up platforms offered in 
Lithuania, for example Startup Lithuania and Startup Highway, but the country's 
research and innovation system is still not adequately developed according to the EU. 
The system fails to provide sufficient incentives for business research development as 
well as cooperation between the public and private sectors. The impact of policies 
already in place, to enhance cooperation between science and business, are well below 
the EU average and Lithuania seems to be using EU funding to replace rather than 




compliment national funding towards research and development. Despite a number of 
strategy documents aimed at the subject as well as different measures and public 
programmes, there is overall lack of coherency which minimizes success. The country 
needs to simplify bureaucratic obstacles that make it difficult for university teams to 
participate in private industry projects and focus more on funding long-lasting 
programmes (European Commission, 2015a). A policy on return migration is not 
included in the model structure.    
6.3.2 Immigration as a solution 
Even though emigration can relieve pressures on the economy by reducing 
unemployment rate that can also cause labour shortages in certain sectors and at the 
same time hinder economic growth (Thaut, 2009). One of the ways to ensure sufficient 
labour availability in the country is to increase immigration of foreigners. Governments 
have to be aware of both long term and short term migration trends when designing a 
policy and in the future, Europe in general will lack sufficient labour force. Immigration 
policies that are restrictive might therefore not be the best solution in the long run 
(Koehler, Laczko, Aghazarm, & Schad, 2010). Demographic challenges that Europe 
faces can only be faced if immigration is included as one of the solutions. Many EU 
countries have however failed to create an attractive environment for foreign workers as 
laws are restrictive in terms of long-term residency. Work and education opportunities 
for family members are limited as well as language support and overall attitude towards 
immigrants in the countries often lacks tolerance (Platonova & Urso, 2012a). 
 Lithuania specifically has been experiencing long term labour force shortages 
within certain sectors, which became increasingly evident in and after 2007. 
Meanwhile, immigration of foreign workers remains low and has even been decreasing 
after the economy crisis in 2008. For example, residence permits for work purposes 
decreased from 4.498 in 2008 to 1.393 in 2010. The policy guidelines approved in 
2008, aimed among other things to increase immigration, do not harmonize with that 
fact, further underlining the wishful nature of the guidelines. At the same time, 
emigration flows after the crisis have been increasing. The number of foreigners in 
Lithuania has been relatively stable over the years counting around 1% of the 
population. Most of the foreigners are citizens of Russia or Belarus that had residence 




in Lithuania before 1990 and remained there after the fall of the Soviet Union without 
filing for Lithuanian citizenship but have a permanent residence permit. Foreign 
workers that have temporary residence permits in Lithuania originate mainly in 
neighbouring countries such as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (Platonova & Urso, 
2012b). Reluctance to increase labour immigration into Lithuania could also be related 
to national security issues evolving around large numbers of Russians working in the 
country. 
 The Migration Policy Guidelines from 2014 mentions that immigration is not high 
in the country compared to the needs of the labour market and that foreign workers are 
mainly concentrated in the service and industry sectors. The guidelines recognize 
inflexible and time consuming procedures to issue work and residence permits as one of 
the key causes for low immigration. No attempts have been made to attract specifically 
foreign workers into sectors that are suffering labour shortages and make procedures 
less difficult to go through. Moreover, foreigners that have studied in Lithuania are 
usually obliged to leave the country after they have obtained their degree. The country is 
therefore not considered to be doing so well when it comes to the selective immigration 
policy of "getting the right people in". In addition to slow administrative processes and 
restrictive legal framework, the country is also competing with other EU countries in 
regards to salaries; a factor that is hard for Lithuania to come up on top in. 
 Integration policies aimed at foreigners are also lacking in Lithuania, but there is no 
central agency or institution that is responsible for the issue. It is divided among many 
ministries and there is no document or regulation in place that supplies guidelines for 
how the integration policy should be managed and NGO's have ultimately provided the 
main infrastructure for integrating foreigners into Lithuanian society. Moreover, in 
comparison to other EU countries, Lithuania ranks at the low end on the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index, which considers access to nationality of migrants, labour 
market mobility, education, family reunification, political participation, long-term 
residence and anti-discriminatory policy. The effectiveness of Lithuania's integration 
measures is therefore considered low in comparison to other EU countries, making 
other countries possibly more attractive for foreigners. Lithuanians are also more likely 
than not to have a negative attitude towards immigrants which is definitely a barrier 
when it comes to integration of foreigners (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 
2014). 




 Many studies have been made that suggest that migration benefits countries in the 
long run and that immigration of foreigners does not have a substantial negative effect 
of either employment levels or wages. The immigrants contribute to the demand of 
goods and services which then further enhances labour demand. Hiring foreign workers 
can also have a decreasing effect on cost of production which instead decreases the cost 
of goods and services. The effect of immigration can therefore be higher on real income 
than on wages alone. The long term and short term effects depend however greatly on 
the flexibility and efficiency of the labour market and mobility of native workers so 
results could vary in terms of skill level, location and sector. Countries such as the UK, 
Spain and Norway are all considered to have benefitted greatly economically due to 
migration of foreign workers into the countries. The countries usually report that native 
workers and foreign ones are complementary in the workforce since the foreign workers 
usually fill positions that native workers either do not want or are not qualified for, 
depending on where labour shortages appear in the labour market. Direct competition 
for jobs between native and foreign workers is therefore often minimal. 
The Lithuanian government needs to be aware of any trends that indicate skill and 
educational system mismatch within labour demand and act accordingly. In the long 
run, getting immigrants to fill the vacant positions within a sector might not be the best 
solution given that there is high unemployment rate in the country. The education 
system then needs to be better tailored to the needs of the market (Platonova & Urso, 
2010). Policies on immigration of foreign workers are not included in the model since it 
is beyond the boundaries of the model.  
6.3.3 Economic growth policy 
 The government acknowledges that the policy intended to encourage return 
migration has not been as successful as hoped in the 2014 Migration Policy Guidelines. 
Admission of foreign immigrants is mainly seen as a part of a wider policy mix 
intended to address the issue of labour shortages in the country. But the government 
recognizes that the relative economic wellbeing in Lithuania compared to the 
destination countries as the main cause of the overall migration problem that the 
country is facing. Easy and overall access of the population to amenities and markets 




coupled with actions aimed at restoring trust in the government are crucial when it 
comes to battling migration (de Haas, 2010).  
 The EU mentions in a report on labour shortages that countries that find themselves 
in that situation can turn to many economic interventions to alleviate the problem, other 
than immigration of foreign workers. Those actions could include increasing wages, 
improve the condition of workers, increase labour force participation among 
demographic groups that are likely to be inactive such as women and current residents 
with a foreign background and investing in education (Platonova & Urso, 2012a). It is 
stated in the Migration Policy Guidelines of Lithuania, approved in 2014, that the 
negative effects of emigration can not only be eliminated through legal or 
administrative regulation, but rather through economic measures. Those could include 
reducing unemployment, job creation, employment stimulation, improvements within 
the health care sector and of people's living conditions as well as create an environment 
fostering wider employment opportunities. If these economic measures would be 
achieved it would weaken the economic and social factors, such as wage differentials 
and level of economic development, that act as push factors in emigration. The policy to 
increase funding in research and development to create an incentive for return migration 
harmonize with the Migration Policy Guidelines to create an environment for more job 
opportunities. 
 In order to deal with the problem that is a side effect of emigration, namely the 
shortage of labour force in Lithuania, a policy on increased labour force participation 
has been included in the model. The policy aims to gradually increase the retirement 
age up to 67 years by 2030 and by that time have 50% of the people at the age between 
60 and 67 active in the labour force. The Lithuanian government already approved 
legislation in 2011 on increasing retirement age gradually up to 65 years in 2026, but 
today women qualify for retirement at the age of 60 and men at the age of 62.5 
(Seputyte, 2011). The goal of the policy was mainly aimed at reducing the government's 
expenses related to the pension system, but also to encourage employment of elderly 
persons (Bitinas, 2011). In a report done by the European Commission where the 
country profile of Lithuania is analysed for 2015, it is stated that sustainability or the 
pension system could be at risk due to the ageing population. What is also mentioned is 
that the working age population is shrinking rapidly which could possibly slow down 
potential economic growth. Lithuania also has one of the fastest aging population and 




the old-age dependency ratio is expected to double by 2040. (European Commission, 
2015a). Overall increase of labour force participation in Lithuania is needed, but in this 
case we focus on the oldest age group by simulating the effects of the policy.  
 
Figure 32 - The structure of the labour force participation policy in the model. 
The structure of the policy can be seen in Figure 32. It is based around a gradual 
increase in the labour force participation rate after 2015 for people aged 60 to 67 using 
a stock and flow. To find the initial labour force participation rate (LFPR) for this age 
group we find the ratio of people aged 60 to 67 years old in the group that is 60 and 
above. That is done by dividing 7 years by the average lifetime after 60 at 2013, which 
is 7/16.87=41.5% for men and 7/22.97=30.5% for women. The participation rate for 60 
and above in 2013 was 9.7% for men and 6.4% for women. That gives us the 
participation rate for the age group 60 to 67 which is 23.4% for men and 21% for 
women if it is assumed that there is no labour participation for people aged 67 and 
above. The change in participation rate after 2015 is the difference between the initial 
LFPR and the goal divided by the years to achieve the goal. The new LFPR for people 
between 60 and 67 is then changed to participation rate for the population over 60 years 
by multiplying it with the ratio of 60 to 67 in the 60 and above group. The policy switch 
is used to activate the policy after 2015 using the new labour force participation rate 
instead of the old one. There is a wishful thinking link between the new participation 
rate after 2015 and the labour force since the structure does not include what is needed 
for the policy to be implemented. 





Figure 33 - Different developments of the labour force of Lithuania over time, depending on the policy and its 
success. 
Without any policy action, the labour force will continue to decline and reach about 
1.05 million in 2050, as can be seen in the graph in Figure 33. If the success of the 
policy is only 50%, the labour force will decline, but not as much as without any action. 
If the policy is implemented with 100% success rate the labour force will decline to 
around 1.12 million. In all these scenarios, the fertility rate is kept stable at 1.59, which 
is the same level as it is in 2013. We use extrapolation for the average lifetime expected 
after 60 years of age to account for the likelihood of growing life expectancy, but 
Eurostat projections expect that life expectancy of men above 60 years will grow to 19 
years and female to 22.6 years by 2050 (Jankauskiene & Medaiskis, 2012). The policy 
does not predict any increase in labour force participation rate for people younger than 
60 and therefore the impact on the labour force development is not great but does 
manage to improve the situation. 
6.4 Implementation and feasibility 
After the economy crisis of 2008, the government of Lithuania, as so many other others, 
had to go through painful budget cuts. The public sector felt those actions throughout 
the system and national institutions and agencies that deal with issues related to 
migration were no exceptions. The budget cuts brought about structural changes and 
loss of human resources within agencies. Before the economy crisis, the Lithuanian 
government both issued policy guidelines and started the Global Lithuania project. Both 
those documents were evidence that the government was ready to tackle the emigration 
issue at hand, but given the financial force majeure that the crisis brought on, resources 




were not allocated to the policy area. Migration is an issue that affects many sectors 
within the public and the Migration Policy Guideline document that was approved in 
2014 includes a section where it is mentioned that the financial crisis did halt financial 
resource allocation. Other implementation challenges that followed were that there was 
no central organization responsible for migration, but rather spread through many 
ministries and their agencies. As Table 2 shows, there are at least five ministries 
responsible for issues related to migration.  
Table 2 – Governmental institutions involved in the migration policy area. Information taken from Resolution No 79 
on Approval of the Lithuanian Migration Policy Guidelines.  
 Responsible agency Responsible for 
Formation of migration 
policy 
Ministry of Interior 
Formation of issues regarding migration 
policy. 
Ministry of Social 
Security and Labour 
Labour policy, social integration of 
foreigners and administration of EU funds 
towards integration. The Lithuanian labour 
exchange agency under the ministry issues 
work permits to foreigners. 
Ministry of Education 
and Science 
Education of foreigners, coordination of 
studies and employment of foreign 
teachers.  
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Visas and policy areas that strengthen the 
relationship of Lithuanians abroad with 
Lithuania. 
Ministry of Economy 
Formation of economic policy, analysis of 
demand and supply of human resources in 
the labour market and acknowledgement of 







Implementation of visas and immigration, 
asylum and Lithuanian citizenship 
procedures, issuing residence permits and 
implementation of the principle of free 
movement of people. 
The Police 
Department 
Controlling and coordinating the operations 
of migration subdivisions of territorial 
police institutions which implement 
migration policy established by laws. 
The State Border 
Guard Service 
National control of migration processes 
throughout the territory of Lithuania. 
 
Coordination between those institutional bodies involved in the policy area is lacking 
and opinions and positions of the institutions are often conflicting. The government has 




not been able to recognize which institution has the competence to oversee and solve 
the issue of integration of foreigners and there is need for more human capital in the 
area, both in regards to staff-to-duties ratio as well as qualification of specialists. These 
things have made it essential for non-governmental organisations to step in and deal 
with issues arising in the policy area. These include the International Organization for 
Migration in Vilnius, the Red Cross and others.  
 Implementation challenges of the policies mentioned above are many since they 
require cooperation between different agencies and ministries and legislation needs to 
be changed by elected officials. Former implementation challenges were discussed in 
the Migration Policy Guidelines, approved in 2014, where lack of funds, resources, 
human capital and coordination between responsible agencies were taken as examples 
of things that were lacking.  
 In the case of the innovation policy aimed at encouraging return migration it is 
unlikely that the policy would be opposed by the public or any interest group since 
investing in research and development is generally seen as a positive thing. The 
program would however need attention from the ministries that are responsible for the 
implementation, namely the Ministry of Social Security and Labour and the Ministry of 
Economy, but there is a danger that other issues would have priority. The policy aimed 
at encouraging immigration of foreign workers to meet the needs of the labour market, 
would face more political opposition since attitudes towards foreigners in Lithuania is 
more likely to be negative. The Ministry of Economy would also need to communicate 
the labour market needs in a sufficient manner to the Migration Department, that issues 
work visas, creating a great deal of coordination as well as access to frequently updated 
statistics on the labour market. The policy on raising the retirement age to 67 to increase 
labour force participation rate would also meet opposition by the public, especially the 
older population. Proposing a policy of that sort can be challenging for elected officials 
since older people are more likely to show up on election day. That policy could also 
entail a cultural feasibility issue and meet opposition by organized interest groups with 
access to the media.  
 When it comes to any kind of policies, they are political in nature and the political 
parties that are involved in their creation have an ultimate motive; to be re-elected. The 
political structure in a country is highly relevant when it comes to the policy making 
process. Weather an issue gains enough momentum to open up the window of 




opportunity for a policy to emerge is dependent on public discourse, media attention 
and where we are in the election term. The policy proposal can change form from the 
time of campaigning to the time the political party is in power, and then again if 
elections are drawing near (Zincone, Penninx, & Borkert, 2011). Policy options will be 
deemed on their political feasibility and how likely it is for a politician to be able to sell 
the idea to its voters. As can be seen in Table 3, the biggest feasibility challenges of the 
three policy options mentioned above are outlined as well as the costs and the benefits 
they entail.  
Table 3 – Outline of policy options  
 Immigration Economic growth Return migration 
Policy proposal 
Simplify work visa and 
residence permit 
processes in order to 
increase inflow of 
foreign labour to the 
sectors that need it. 
Raising the retirement age 
to 67 years to increase 
labour force participation. 
Decrease youth 
unemployment. 
Foster innovation with 
better framework for start-
up companies. Increase 
funding and emphasis on 
research and development. 
Responsibility for 
implementation 
Ministry of Social 
Security and Labour in 
cooperation with the 
Migration Department. 
Ministry of Social Security 
and Labour in cooperation 
with the Ministry of 
Economy. 
Ministry of Education and 
Science in cooperation 
Ministry of Social 
Security and Labour 
Cost/benefit 
Overall economic gain 
for the country. Funds 
needed to the Migration 
Department. 
Decreased budget deficit 
of pension system and 
increased labour force. 
Funds needed to change 
administrative processes. 
Benefits more likely 
visible in long run. Will 
require high costs to fund 
the program. 
Feasibility 
Politically it will prove 
as a challenge since 
public opinion is likely 
to be negative towards 
immigrants. 
Increase retirement age 
unpopular. Voters tend to 
be older so less political 
feasibility. Cultural 
feasibility could pose a 
challenge. 
Positive for political 
feasibility since it has the 
potential to score with 
voters. 
 
Overall, good quality statistics regarding migration are essential when dealing with the 
task of creating policy options. If accurate numbers on population stocks and flows are 
unavailable or insufficient in any way, it makes it that much harder for policy makers to 
know whether they can allocate enough resources towards a solution. Any evaluation of 
one policy option over the other becomes almost pointless if information about scale 
and composition of those who migrate is missing. In those cases, objectives and 
measurements for success become blurred and funds needed to reach any policy goals 
will most likely be underestimated. Migration policy that is not supported by good data 




and statistics can therefore lead us on a path that wastes both time and money 
(Chudinovskikh, 2011). 





The aim of this thesis was to contribute to and extend the research literature on 
migration and apply the system dynamics approach to explain parts of the phenomenon 
in Lithuania. The approach is well suited to tackle this sort of analysis as complex 
models can be built intuitively. The model built in this thesis is drawn from literature in 
neo-classical economic theory and network theory. Using the model it is possible to 
explain part of the emigration patterns that have been occurring in Lithuania in the 12 
years between 2001 and 2013. The model however fails to capture the complete 
dynamics of the process.  
 Nevertheless, using the model to forecast future trends and scenarios revealed that 
with current rates of fertility, mortality and emigration, Lithuania's labour force will 
continue to drop by 2050. This trend is not sustainable for the country and measures 
need to be taken by the government. Actions to reverse the trend or at least minimize its 
effect on the labour force and economic growth could include policy measures aimed at 
investing in research and development, increasing labour force participation rates, 
increase return migration and increase immigration of foreign workforce. The feasibility 
of such policy options are dependent on better coordination and cooperation between 
governmental agencies responsible, allocation of funds and resources as well as 
political environment in the country.  
 This work is a first step in modelling the problem of emigration in Lithuania and it 
can be built upon. Drawing from further migration literature the model could be 
extended in order to better replicate the trend. Estimates of uncertain parameters need to 
be looked at in more depth, especially the high sensitivity parameters mentioned earlier 
and the emigration cost index. All this work and future research are dependent on good 
quality statistics that represents reality and Lithuania could benefit from comparing 
their data with the major destination countries, especially when it comes to emigration 
flows. 
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APPENDIX A – MODEL DATA 
Population statistics 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Data source
Total annual average population 3499500 3470800 3443000 3415200 3377000 3322500 3269900 3231300 3198200 3162900 3097300 3028100 2987800 2957700 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Total adult population 2789500 2786000 2783400 2782200 2768200 2748879 2716996 2699113 2686730 2672147 2627263 2573682 2543739 2521124 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Total labour force 1671500 1635800 1630300 1641900 1620600 1606800 1588300 1603100 1565600 1528100 1518100 1481600 1472500 1465200 Labour Market Yearbooks Lithuania 
Total children population 710000 684800 659600 633000 608800 573621 552904 532187 511470 490753 470037 454418 444061 436576 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Migration statistics
Estimated emigration  by Statistics Lithuania 21816 27841 16719 26283 37691 57885 32390 30383 25750 38300 83157 53863 41100 38818 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Immigration 1510 4694 5110 4728 5553 6789 7745 8609 9297 6487 5213 15685 19843 22011 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Net migration -20306 -2559 -1976 -6304 -9612 -8782 -4857 -5244 -7718 -15483 -77944 -38178 -21257 -16807 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Emigration to former USSR countries 1426 3648 3453 3370 3052 4141 2297 1990 1625 2007 1479 1100 932 1111 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Reference mode adjusted emigration 21816 27841 16719 26283 37691 57886 39929 37922 33289 45839 53000 53863 41100 38818
Children age 0 to 14 emigrating 2147 2950 2950 2300 3000 7937 4100 2800 2700 3000 8483 5651 5179 5060 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Children age 0 to 14 immigrating 756 756 812 812 581 859 1059 1105 1163 954 630 1404 1968 2331 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Death rates
Age 0-14 0,0008 0,0007 0,0007 0,0006 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0006 0,0006 0,0006 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Age 15-29 0,0014 0,0015 0,0014 0,0013 0,0013 0,0014 0,0014 0,0014 0,0012 0,0011 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Age 30-44 0,0033 0,0036 0,0034 0,0035 0,0034 0,0037 0,00385 0,0041 0,0037 0,0035 0,003 0,0029 0,003 0,003 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Age 45-59 0,0099 0,0105 0,01 0,0101 0,0105 0,0113 0,0117 0,012 0,0113 0,0095 0,0094 0,009 0,009 0,009 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Average lifetime expectancy after age 60
Males 16,99 16,13 16,11 16,17 16,21 15,65 15,55 15,4 15,98 16,04 16,4 16,6 16,75 16,87 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Females 22,21 21,74 21,82 22,1 21,92 21,66 21,55 21,73 21,9 22,22 22,55 22,89 23,01 22,97 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
Annual average income adjusted for PPP in USD
United Kingdom 38137 39715 40176 41254 41940 41729 42711 43634 43028 43037 42319 41494 41496 41192 OECD
Ireland 39845 40878 40810 41994 43402 45219 45863 47037 48915 52838 52108 50989 51218 49506 OECD
Norway 35665 36540 37935 39196 40516 41633 43230 45042 46013 46460 47024 48635 49663 50282 OECD
Spain 33100 33713 33792 33643 33194 33325 33216 33692 34965 37176 36512 36140 35033 34824 OECD
Germany 41000 41716 41994 41983 41909 41794 41888 41886 42133 42138 42184 42859 43361 43682 OECD
Unemployment rate in %
Lithuania 16,5 17,3 13,8 12,4 11,3 8,2 5,6 4,3 5,8 13,7 17,8 15,5 14,5 13 osp.stat.gov.lt 
United Kingdom 5,4 5 5,1 5 4,7 4,8 5,4 5,3 5,6 7,6 7,8 8 7,9 7,5 Eurostat
Ireland 4,2 3,9 4,5 4,6 4,5 4,4 4,5 4,7 6,4 12 13,9 14,7 14,7 13,1 Eurostat
Norway 3,4 3,5 3,9 4,5 4,5 4,6 3,4 2,5 2,6 3,2 3,6 3,3 3,2 3,5 Eurostat
Spain 11,9 10,6 11,5 11,5 11 9,2 8,5 8,2 11,3 17,9 19,9 21,4 24,8 26,1 Eurostat
Germany 7,9 7,8 8,6 9,7 10,4 11,2 10,1 8,5 7,4 7,6 7,1 5,9 5,5 5,3 Eurostat
 





Job vacancies 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Data source
Lithuania 5000 5580 6160 6740 7320 7900 19500 26700 13000 5800 6700 9800 10500 10700 Yearbooks of Labour Statistics Lithuania 
United Kingdom 358266 563166 605333 587666 638583 621166 603000 659666 616750 443333 471500 467750 467750 467750 OECD
Ireland 48848 48848 48413 50643 62207 68112 74204 102789 73185 54835 49079 48658 58890 58890 www.delni.gov.uk and OECD
Norway 18424 15191 12225 11114 10707 13321 18894 24302 26571 23875 24323 26703 19646 17787 OECD
Spain 106791 116460 130919 149534 150802 150802 150802 150802 150802 150802 150802 150802 150802 150802 OECD
Germany 452102 430995 372452 266281 206031 255758 354287 423439 389047 300640 359348 466288 477527 456974 OECD
Labour force participation rate
Age 15 to 29 male 0,5887 0,564 0,545 0,54 0,5157 0,5027 0,501 0,51 0,5193 0,5237 0,5047 0,5123 0,512 0,533 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 15 to 29 female 0,597 0,584 0,579 0,58 0,569 0,563 0,553 0,555 0,558 0,565 0,568 0,574 0,577 0,58 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 30 to 44 male 0,9137 0,9157 0,925 0,923 0,9233 0,92 0,8993 0,8893 0,8903 0,891 0,9073 0,9217 0,9217 0,924 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 30 to 44 female 0,8873 0,8917 0,8827 0,8843 0,8823 0,879 0,8557 0,859 0,852 0,8693 0,89 0,905 0,9027 0,8983 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 45 to 59 male 0,8227 0,824 0,8353 0,843 0,8337 0,821 0,8097 0,8167 0,814 0,8157 0,831 0,853 0,8497 0,851 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 45 to 59 female 0,7593 0,7523 0,7613 0,798 0,8127 0,7883 0,778 0,7783 0,765 0,7933 0,8167 0,831 0,8353 0,8317 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 60 and above male 0,091 0,085 0,083 0,092 0,095 0,099 0,088 0,101 0,102 0,095 0,089 0,093 0,097 0,097 osp.stat.gov.lt
Age 60 and above female 0,047 0,036 0,035 0,041 0,038 0,042 0,044 0,052 0,059 0,061 0,053 0,06 0,064 0,064 osp.stat.gov.lt
Emigration cost
Airline deregulation index 0,572 0,567 0,562 0,557 0,539 0,521 0,503 0,4655 0,428 0,3905 0,353 0,353 0,353 0,353 OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index
Internet penetration rate 0,0643 0,0718 0,1769 0,2591 0,3123 0,3622 0,439 0,499 0,5522 0,5976 0,6212 0,6505 0,68 0,685 www.migrationpolicycentre.eu
Other statistics
Total Fertility rate 1,39 1,3 1,24 1,26 1,26 1,29 1,31 1,35 1,47 1,55 1,5 1,55 1,6 1,59 Demographic Yearbooks Lithuania
GDP Per Capita Lithuania PPP 8618,503 9588,201 10646,77 12187,47 13260,55 14658,68 16756,74 19078,67 20617,46 18093,44 19843,44 22322,04 23813,41 25453,54 The World Bank
Persons employed in Lithuania 1473815 1439858 1405900 1438000 1436300 1473900 1499000 1534200 1520000 1317400 1247700 1253600 1275700 1292800 Yearbooks of Labour Statistics Lithuania
Exchange rate USD in LTL 4 4 3,664 3,056 2,781 2,778 2,75 2,518 2,356 2,485 2,607 2,483 2,687 2,597 www.bundesbank.de
Average gross montly earnings LTL 970 982 1013 1072 1149 1276 1495 1802 2151 2056 1988 2045 2123 2231 Labour Market Yearbooks Lithuania 




APPENDIX B - MODEL EQUATIONS 
Below is the source code for the equations from the iThink model. 
 
Adults_interested__in_migration[Age, Gender](t) = 
Adults_interested__in_migration[Age, Gender](t - dt) + 
(becoming_interested[Age, Gender] + Age_in_interested[Age, 
Gender] - labour_emigration[Age, Gender, Country] - 
labour_emigration[Age, Gender, Country] - labour_emigration[Age, 
Gender, Country] - labour_emigration[Age, Gender, Country] - 
labour_emigration[Age, Gender, Country] - Deaths_interested[Age, 
Gender] - Age_out_interested[Age, Gender]) * dt 
 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_15_to_29, Male] = 7495 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_15_to_29, Female] = 
7341 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_30_to_44, Male] = 7758 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_30_to_44, Female] = 
8114 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_45_to_59, Male] = 5488 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_45_to_59, Female] = 
6502 
INIT Adults_interested__in_migration[Age_60_and_above, Male] = 
4915 









Age_in_interested[Age_15_to_29, Gender] = 0 
Age_in_interested[Age_30_to_44, Gender] = 
Age_out_interested[Age_15_to_29, Gender] 
 
Age_in_interested[Age_45_to_59, Gender] = 
Age_out_interested[Age_30_to_44, Gender] 
 










































Age_out_interested[Age_60_and_above, Gender] = 0 
 
Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age, Gender](t) = 
Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age, Gender](t - dt) + 
(Return_migration[Age, Gender, Country] + Return_migration[Age, 
Gender, Country] + Return_migration[Age, Gender, Country] + 
Return_migration[Age, Gender, Country] + Return_migration[Age, 
Gender, Country] + becoming_adult[Age, Gender] + 
age_transition_in_not_int[Age, Gender] - 
becoming_interested[Age, Gender] - Deaths_not_interested[Age, 
Gender] - age_transition_out_not_int[Age, Gender]) * dt 
 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_15_to_29, Male] = 
367272 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_15_to_29, Female] = 
359704 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_30_to_44, Male] = 
380121 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_30_to_44, Female] = 
397588 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_45_to_59, Male] = 
268888 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_45_to_59, Female] = 
318616 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_60_and_above, Male] 
= 240815 
INIT Adults_not_interested_in_migrating[Age_60_and_above, 
Female] = 418719 












becoming_adult[Age_15_to_29, Gender] = 
becoming_adult_per_year*1/2 
becoming_adult[Age_30_to_44, Gender] = 0 
becoming_adult[Age_45_to_59, Gender] = 0 
becoming_adult[Age_60_and_above, Gender] = 0 
 
age_transition_in_not_int[Age_15_to_29, Gender] = 0 
 
age_transition_in_not_int[Age_30_to_44, Gender] = 
(age_transition_out_not_int[Age_15_to_29, Gender]) 
 
age_transition_in_not_int[Age_45_to_59, Gender] = 
(age_transition_out_not_int[Age_30_to_44, Gender]) 
 









































age_transition_out_not_int[Age_60_and_above, Gender] = 0 
 
children(t) = children(t - dt) + (births + child_immigration - 
children_deaths - becoming_adult_per_year - child_emigration) * 
dt 
 
















children_deaths = (children*child_death_rate) 
 






LF_participation_rate__after_2015_of_60_to_67[Gender](t - dt) + 
(Change_in_participation_rate_after_2015[Gender]) * dt 
 
INIT LF_participation_rate__after_2015_of_60_to_67[Male] = 
0.097*1/(6/16.87) 





Change_in_participation_rate_after_2015[Gender] =  






INIT Lithuanian_Migrants[Age, Gender, UK] = 235 
INIT Lithuanian_Migrants[Age, Gender, Ireland] = 220 
INIT Lithuanian_Migrants[Age, Gender, Norway] = 40 
INIT Lithuanian_Migrants[Age, Gender, Spain] = 230 
INIT Lithuanian_Migrants[Age, Gender, Germany] = 1180 












Age_in_migrants[Age_15_to_29, Gender, Country] = 0 
 
Age_in_migrants[Age_30_to_44, Gender, Country] =  
Age_out_migrants[Age_15_to_29, Gender, Country] 
 
Age_in_migrants[Age_45_to_59, Gender, Country] = 
Age_out_migrants[Age_30_to_44, Gender, Country] 
 
Age_in_migrants[Age_60_and_above, Gender, Country] = 




Return_migration[Age , Gender, Country] = 




Deaths__migrants[Age_15_to_29, Gender, Country] = 
Lithuanian_Migrants[Age_15_to_29, Gender, 
Country]*Death_rate[Age_15_to_29] 
Deaths__migrants[Age_30_to_44, Gender, Country] = 
Lithuanian_Migrants[Age_30_to_44, Gender, 
Country]*Death_rate[Age_30_to_44] 
Deaths__migrants[Age_45_to_59, Gender, Country] = 
Lithuanian_Migrants[Age_45_to_59, Gender, 
Country]*Death_rate[Age_45_to_59] 




Age_out_migrants[Age_15_to_29, Gender, Country] = 
Lithuanian_Migrants[Age_15_to_29, Gender, 
Country]/Maturation__time 
Age_out_migrants[Age_30_to_44, Gender, Country] = 
Lithuanian_Migrants[Age_30_to_44, Gender, 
Country]/Maturation__time 
Age_out_migrants[Age_45_to_59, Gender, Country] = 
Lithuanian_Migrants[Age_45_to_59, Gender, 
Country]/Maturation__time 





















contacts__per_year = 25 
 
Costs_of_obtaining_information = 1-Internet_penetration_rate 
 
Costs_of_social__exclusion[Country] = 
GRAPH(sum(Lithuanian_Migrants[*, *, Country])) 
(0.00, 0.99), (20000, 0.952), (40000, 0.797), (60000, 0.47), 
(80000, 0.333), (100000, 0.238), (120000, 0.152), (140000, 




(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 0.95), (3.00, 0.902), (4.00, 
0.771), (5.00, 0.613), (6.00, 0.492), (7.00, 0.384), (8.00, 
0.283), (9.00, 0.162), (10.0, 0.108), (11.0, 0.0698), (12.0, 




(0.00, 0.508), (4.76, 0.531), (9.52, 0.542), (14.3, 0.588), 
(19.0, 0.612), (23.8, 0.646), (28.6, 0.669), (33.3, 0.738), 
(38.1, 0.831), (42.9, 0.9), (47.6, 1.00), (52.4, 1.11), (57.1, 
1.28), (61.9, 1.55), (66.7, 1.87), (71.4, 2.19), (76.2, 2.44), 































Fractional_getting_interested_rate[Age_15_to_29] = 0.02 
Fractional_getting_interested_rate[Age_30_to_44] = 0.015 
Fractional_getting_interested_rate[Age_45_to_59] = 0.01 
Fractional_getting_interested_rate[Age_60_and_above] = 0.005 
 
Future_fertility__scenarios = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 1.61), (2015, 1.61), (2016, 1.62), (2016, 1.62), (2017, 
1.63), (2017, 1.63), (2017, 1.64), (2018, 1.64), (2018, 1.65), 
(2018, 1.65), (2019, 1.66), (2019, 1.66), (2020, 1.67), (2020, 
1.68), (2020, 1.68), (2021, 1.68), (2021, 1.69), (2021, 1.70), 
(2022, 1.70), (2022, 1.70), (2023, 1.71), (2023, 1.71), (2023, 
1.72), (2024, 1.73), (2024, 1.73), (2024, 1.74), (2025, 1.75), 
(2025, 1.76), (2026, 1.77), (2026, 1.78), (2026, 1.79), (2027, 
1.80), (2027, 1.81), (2027, 1.82), (2028, 1.83), (2028, 1.84), 
(2029, 1.85), (2029, 1.86), (2029, 1.87), (2030, 1.89), (2030, 
1.90) 
 
GDP_Per_Capita_USA_PPP_2013 = 53042 
 
Immigration__policy[UK] = if time <2004 then 0.95 else 0.05 
Immigration__policy[Ireland] = if time <2004 then 0.95 else 0.05 
Immigration__policy[Norway] = if time <2007 then 0.95 else 0.05 
Immigration__policy[Spain] = if time <2006 then 0.95 else 0.05 
Immigration__policy[Germany] = if time <2007 then 0.95 else 0.05 
 
























Gender])*LF_participation_rate[Age_60_and_above, Gender])  
else  








LF_participation_rate_after_2015[Age_15_to_29, Gender] = 0 
LF_participation_rate_after_2015[Age_30_to_44, Gender] = 0 
LF_participation_rate_after_2015[Age_45_to_59, Gender] = 0 
 




Maturation__time = 15 
 





normal_avg__time_abroad = 5 
 
normal_emigration__fractioal_rate[Country] = 0.01 
 
Participation_rate_goal_of_60_to_67[Male] = 0.5 






Physical_costs = Airline_deregulation_index 
 
Policy_delay[Country] = DELAY1(Immigration__policy,1) 
 
Policy_switch_fertility = 0 
{Switch: 1 = ON,  0 = OFF} 
 









probability_of_emigration_if_contacted[Country] = 0.05 
 





Probability_of_LF__policy_working = 0.5 
 















(2001, 27841), (2002, 16719), (2003, 26283), (2004, 37691), 
(2005, 57886), (2006, 39929), (2007, 37922), (2008, 33289), 





(0.00, 1.00), (0.5, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.50, 1.38), (2.00, 
1.56), (2.50, 1.70), (3.00, 1.81), (3.50, 1.89), (4.00, 1.95), 











(0.00, 0.657), (0.2, 0.683), (0.4, 0.743), (0.6, 0.829), (0.8, 
0.929), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 1.73), (1.40, 2.73), (1.60, 3.80), 
(1.80, 4.61), (2.00, 5.00) 
 




























Total_labour_emigration = SUM(labour_emigration) 
 
total_labour_force = sum(labor_force) 
 






Total_return_migration = sum(Return_migration[*, *, *]) 
unemployment__rate = (sum(labor_force)-
employment)/sum(labor_force) 
Years_to_achieve_goal = 15 
Years_working_after_60 = 6 
 
 
